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SUMMARY
While the US intelligence community worries
about the emergence of “Da’esh 2.0,” the US security
cooperation community has to worry about the
development of the “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 4.0”
that will have to fight Da’esh and meet a broad range
of other security and defense requirements. Here,
the “4.0” refers to the facts that this is not the United
States’ first attempt to assist the Iraqis in building
their defense capacity and the United States is not
the first security partner to try. Britain and the Soviet
Union also took their turns developing Iraqi military
capabilities, both with similar results.
None of these difficulties, however, should be a
surprise. A survey of Iraqi military history suggests
a pattern of strengths, weaknesses, and performance
that includes courageous soldiers, cohesive units,
incompetent leaders, divided loyalties, poor combat
support, and weak institutions that have, on occasion,
risen to the defense challenge. As a result, the Iraqi
Army continues to be plagued by a number of crippling
deficiencies including a disunified command; endemic
corruption; poor communications, intelligence, and
logistics; and high rates of absenteeism, all of which
are exacerbated by sectarian divisions inflamed and
exploited by Iran.
Moving forward, the United States needs to first
determine the purpose of this cooperation. Security
cooperation with Iraq is not just about defeating the
Islamic State or other terrorist groups. It should also
not be about establishing a partner that can threaten
Iranian interests. The Iranians and the Iraqis fought
a long, bloody war and have no interest in doing so
again. However, the United States stands to gain
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when Iraq can play a constructive security role as
an accepted member of the broader regional and
international community. Iran cannot get the Iraqi
military to that point, but the United States can. Thus,
the long-term goal of US security cooperation with
Iraq should be to establish its military as a valuable
security partner, capable of participating in regional
security arrangements, much in the same way Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and even Oman does.
Now is the time to reinvigorate efforts to develop
the Iraqi armed forces. Iraq’s victory over the Islamic
State has allowed it, for the first time in its history,
to play the role of liberator in a way that bridges
Iraq’s sectarian cleavages. For the United States and
its partners to take advantage of this opportunity,
however, they will have to overcome significant
challenges. Despite widespread protests against
malign Iranian influence, Iran’s control over the
Iraqi government is undiminished and will constrain
what kind of cooperation it can have with the United
States. Moreover, despite the image of Iraqi soldier as
liberator after the fight against the Islamic State, its
role in suppressing widespread protests in southern
Iraq risks mediating that image with that of oppressor.
At the same time, the establishment of the Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a separate armed force
threatens competition for roles and resources, which
will undermine the Iraqi military’s effectiveness.
On that point, it is often said when it comes to
Iraq, the Iranians are playing chess while the United
States plays checkers. That’s not exactly true. The
United States is playing chess. Like the Iranians, the
United States engages a range of diplomatic, security,
economic, and social actors and institutions. Unlike
the Iranians, it does so to encourage them to set aside
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sectarian difference and corrupt practices to build
an inclusive, prosperous Iraq that is a contributing
member to global society. More to the point, and again
unlike the Iranians, it provides billions of dollars in
reconstruction and security assistance and connects
the Iraqi government to regional and international
partners to further assist development of critical
institutions.
Still, while the United States may be playing chess,
it is more apt to say the Iranians are playing “Settlers
of Catan.” By playing chess, the United States seems to
think that this “game” ends when it captures the king,
or in the context of Iraq, when the Iraqi government
behaves consistently according to US interests.
Meanwhile, the Iranians will have built a road over
the chess board taking not only the king, but the park
in which everyone is playing. In the Iraqi context,
however, this game never ends. But more to the point,
losing one source of power or influence does not end
the game, it just requires one have others to rely upon.
Unlike the United States, Iran gains this influence
by exploiting the sectarian differences and corrupt
practices that the United States seeks to discourage.
Still all is not lost. The United States has a
number of comparative advantages over Iran that,
if used properly, can set conditions for a more
professional army. Those comparative advantages
do not just include superior weapons, equipment,
and maintenance support. They also include superior
intelligence and logistics support as well as, when
appropriate, access to coalition air and indirect fire
assets. After the experience of fighting Da’esh with US
assistance, it will be difficult for Iraqi leaders to turn
down the quality of equipment, support, and expertise
the United States-led coalition can offer. This point
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suggests that a significant component of US security
cooperation should emphasize interoperability where
Iraqi forces can “plug into” US capabilities with
relative ease so it can better support Iraqi military
operations.
Additionally, partnership with the United States
can facilitate greater connectivity to the international
community, which will increase the resources available
for development and which can, over time, bolster the
country’s legitimacy as a responsible, international
actor. Though there is not necessarily a correlation
between positive international engagement and an
increasingly trusted and competent Iraqi Army, the
benefits of such do serve as incentives for the Iraqis to
make at least some of the necessary reforms.
In exploiting these advantages, the United States
needs to ensure that whether support is offered or
withheld, it is done so with specific behaviors in
mind. Prior to the rise of the Islamic State, the United
States withheld much critical support, especially
intelligence, because of Iraq’s relationship with Iran.
What was missing from that dynamic was specific
asks regarding Iraq’s cooperation with Iran that could
open up mutually beneficial space for the United
States to better cooperate with Iraqis to prevent an
Islamic terrorist resurgence. As a result, Iraqi requests
for support often went unmet while there was nothing
specific individual Iraqi partners could do to address
US concerns.
At the same time, the United States also provided
much critical support, including aircraft and major
weapon systems in addition to an ongoing training
relationship with the counterterrorism service (CTS).
The result was predictably mixed. The Iraqi military
had a number of high-end systems they could not
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maintain or use effectively while the CTS transformed
into the Iraqi armed forces most capable unit. It may
have been possible to expand that kind of positive
influence, but only had the United States made
provision of these systems contingent on access
and minimum standards of professional behavior,
including adherence to effective maintenance
practices.
In addressing these concerns, the United States is
not going to compete with Iranian influence using the
same means as the Iranians. In fact, it is a strength of
the US approach that it seeks to remove the corruption
and sectarianism the Iranians exploit. This asymmetry
in approaches, however, gives Iran the upper hand in
the short term, as they are able to benefit individual
Iraqi decisionmakers who use the Iraqi government as
a source of revenue with which they can build their
own patronage networks. Meanwhile, US efforts
benefit the Iraqi state but individuals more indirectly.
As a result, progress is slow to take hold and easily
undermined.
However, as the protests in 2019 clearly
demonstrated, the Iraqi people want to be part of
a state that is not only more functional, but better
integrated with the international community. Thus the
protestors’ demands place pressure on Iraqi leaders
to make meaningful reforms. However, without
the proper encouragement and support, there will
not likely be sufficient collective will to withstand
Iranian influence and overcome barriers to progress.
In providing that encouragement and support, the
United States should use its comparative advantage to
incentivize the following measures to address critical
shortcomings that must be resolved if the Iraqi Army
is to professionalize.
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UNITY OF COMMAND
• Encourage the appointment of a non-sectarian
and militarily competent Chief of Defense who
would answer for all security services, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), to
the prime minister.
• Recruit and train capable junior leaders who
respond through the chain of command to the
“clearly recognized leadership” of the Chief of
Defense. US leadership can quietly identify such
leaders and encourage the Iraqi government to
appoint them.
• Identify alternative chains of command and continue to discourage their use by reinforcing the
formal chain. To facilitate this effort, US advisors should reinforce ties between the Ministry
of Defense, the National Operations Center, and
the Chief of the Army.
• Identify overlapping areas of responsibility
within the army and other services, including
the PMF, and seek ways to make competing
roles and responsibilities more complementary.
CORRUPTION
• Make US support, including training and equipment, contingent on units adopting accountability practices, in the same way the United
States does end-service monitoring. The idea is
to set up a dynamic where a relationship with
the US Army brings sufficient benefit—tangible
and intangible—such that abandoning corrupt
practices will be worthwhile.
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• Leverage US support to get the Iraqis to adopt
procedures to reduce the opportunities for corruption, such as establishing individual bank
accounts from which Iraqi soldiers would be
paid.
• Leverage technology to the extent Iraqis can
adequately absorb it to reinforce corruptionresistant procedures.
• Encourage senior Iraqi leadership to develop
and promulgate a professional ethic compatible with Iraqi culture which establishes an Iraqi
Army identity encouraging commitment to
humanitarian ideals, competence, and effective
stewardship of the profession.
POOR COMBAT SUPPORT:
COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND
LOGISTICS
• Encourage Iraqis not to use civilian communications infrastructure, especially cell phones, that
is extremely unreliable and unsecure. Rather,
encourage the use and maintenance of military
communications.
• Improve intelligence sharing and, more importantly, interoperability of the US and Iraqi intelligence organizations to provide Iraqi forces
with timely and actionable tactical intelligence.
• Discourage the use of intelligence and security
services to monitor each other’s activities.
• Encourage Iraqis to develop sustainable technical solutions that provide independent accounting for supplies, spare parts, and maintenance
activities.
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• Emphasize logistic interoperability so US logistics capabilities can assist the Iraqis quickly in
times of crisis.
ABSENTEEISM, ADMINISTRATION, AND RISK
AVERSION
• Improve administrative capabilities to ensure
better accountability, resources, and pay for soldiers as well as limit opportunities to inflate unit
rosters with “ghost soldiers.” Better accountability will improve soldier quality of life and
begin to build trust between soldiers and their
leaders.
• Recruit college graduates, particularly those
in technical fields, to assume roles as junior
officers.
• Emphasize individual and small-unit skills with
the aim to build a competent base of skilled soldiers and junior leaders while setting the conditions for developing capabilities for larger unit
operations.
• Emphasize relationships between US professional military educational schools with Iraq’s.
These relationships should emphasize both tactical and operational skills and the standards
associated with establishing and maintaining
a profession. Additionally, the United States
should attempt to reinvigorate Iraq’s Defense
Language Institute English language programs,
as doing so would facilitate interoperability
with US forces and the larger coalition.
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SECTARIANISM
• Avoid zero tolerance policies regarding Iranian presence. Certain kinds of Iranian influence should limit US cooperation, but making
the Iraqis always choose between a relationship
with the United States and a relationship with
Iran simply cedes space to the Iranians. Rely on
US advantages the Iranians cannot replicate and
make any support contingent on taking steps
required to build a more professional, nonsectarian Iraqi Army.
• Publicize instances of malign Iranian influence.
• Discourage the Iraqi government from creating new security institutions and encourage
it to place all security organizations under the
direct operational control of either the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior, as
appropriate.
• Maintain a relationship with and support for
Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades. Play a role in
building up the Regional Guard Brigades, but
in a way that builds, or at least does not undermine, ties with Baghdad. Avoid the zero-sum
game of Iraqi politics: supporting the Kurds
could be seen as a threat by Baghdad and result
in restrictions on its cooperation with the United
States. Alienating Baghdad risks ceding more
space to the Iranians, as good relations with
Baghdad are necessary to contesting malign
Iranian influence.
• Encourage more international cooperation to
increase the resources available to the Iraqi
Army and legitimate the US presence in ways
the Iranians will not be able to replicate.
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• Encourage a local role for the various militias
similar to the model the British employed during
the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman. In Oman, the
British convinced the Omani sultan to establish
firqat, which were platoon-to-company-sized
organizations of tribal fighters who came from
the same tribes that were rebelling. They were
employed locally, had a few British Special Air
Service advisors, and served as scouts, guides,
and “home guards” that were able to consolidate regular Omani force gains.
With Da’esh no longer in control of Iraqi territory,
the rationale for US direct action, large numbers of
advisors, and robust intelligence and logistics support
will disappear. This point is true from the perspectives
of both the Iraqis and the United States. For the Iraqis’
part, they will likely accept—and the Iranians will
likely tolerate—only limited forms of US cooperation
against Da’esh and any other militant groups that
again threaten Iraqi sovereignty. For the United States’
part, limited resources and growing global security
challenges will likely divert its attention—and, with
it, security cooperation resources—elsewhere. These
points suggest whatever bilateral US cooperation
survives in post-Da’esh Iraq will be inadequate to the
task of wholly professionalizing the Iraqi Army, much
less the other defense and security institutions.
Engagement will have to steady and successes will
likely be small and incremental.
Despite this bleak assessment, all is not necessarily
lost. It should be clear from this analysis that no
external party, neither the United States nor Iran, will
ever be in a position to entirely address the political,
social, cultural, and economic factors that impede
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the Iraqi Army’s ability to professionalize. But by
directing attention to the conditions that facilitate the
growth of a professional officer and noncommissioned
officer corps, one can help develop institutions that
communicate and expand expert knowledge as
well as the factors that undermine trust. In this way,
external actors can influence the Iraqi Army to make
the reforms necessary to become an effective fighting
force.
Moreover, the current moment in Iraq’s military
history gives it rare momentum to reform. As long as
it does not embrace again its role in the suppression
of domestic opposition, the Iraqi Army can capitalize
on its image as national liberator and defender to
attract the right kind of recruits as well as the urgency
of its ongoing defense requirements to enact the right
kinds of reforms. To support such efforts, the United
States should engage in continued, steady efforts
emphasizing the critical areas discussed above to
set conditions for meaningful improvement when
political and social conditions permit. Of course, no
one measure is going to improve the Iraqi Army. But,
taken together, these recommendations represent
a good chance for US security cooperation efforts to
achieve a “tipping point” that enables the kind of
reform that can allow the Iraqi Army to move beyond
its historic limitations.
As US security cooperators attempt to set those
conditions on what will likely be a shoestring budget,
getting to that tipping point will require implementing
measures aimed at building trust within the Iraqi
Army and with the other security services and the
civilian government. Building that trust will allow
the Iraqi Army to better harness the resources it has,
establish the kinds of institutions that can sustain its

xix

current momentum toward meaningful reform, and
establish itself as a professional, effective military
force in a region in desperate need of stability.
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PROFESSIONALIZING THE IRAQI ARMY: US
ENGAGEMENT AFTER THE ISLAMIC STATE
INTRODUCTION
While the US intelligence community worries
about the emergence of “Da’esh 2.0,” the US security
cooperation community has to worry about the
development of the “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 4.0”
that will have to fight Da’esh and meet a broad range
of security and defense requirements.1 Here, the “4.0”
refers to the facts that this is not the United States’ first
attempt to assist the Iraqis in building their defense
capacity and the United States is not the first security
partner to try. Britain and the Soviet Union also took
their turns developing Iraqi military capabilities, both
with similar results.2
Of course, neither the intelligence nor security
cooperation tasks are easy; however, developing the
Iraqi Army poses a number of challenges that are as
much a function of Iraqi military history and culture as
they are about choices regarding equipment, doctrine,
1. For the purposes of this discussion, I will refer to the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant by the English rendering of
the Arabic acronym, “Da’esh.”
2. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus exclusively,
except where noted, on the Iraqi Army, as described in the
Iraq entry in the Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The
Gulf States database. IHS Markit, Iraq, Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment: The Gulf States, September 10, 2018, https://my.ihs
.com/Janes?th=JANES&callingurl=https://janes.ihs.com. The army
includes 13 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, supporting
units, and special operations forces. Many of the conclusions here
apply to Iraq’s other security services. I will use “Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF)” to refer to the combination of Iraqi military and law
enforcement organizations.
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and training. Even before its decisive defeat in 2003 by
the United States-led coalition, the Iraqi military lost
to Kurdish rebels, the Israelis, the Iranian Army, and
the United States. Moreover, despite several years of
focused security assistance and cooperation by the
United States, the Iraqi military was again decisively
defeated by a small number of Da’esh fighters who
seized significant parts of northern Iraq in 2014.
These defeats occurred despite assistance from
partners with effective militaries. The British trained
the Iraqi Army that lost to the Kurds in the 1930s
and Israelis in the 1940s.3 The Soviet Union trained
and equipped the Iraqi Army that lost to the Israelis
in the 1970s and the Iranians in the 1980s. The Iraqi
Army did eventually enjoy some limited success
against the Iranians at the end of the Iran-Iraq War,
which had as much to do with Iranian weaknesses
as it did the strengths the Iraqi Army does possess.
Up to that point, the Iraqi military’s most significant
successes were against its own people, especially
rebellious Assyrians and tribal groups, as well as its
own government, which it overthrew no less than five
times between 1936 and 1968.
A number of scholars account for the Iraqi
military’s difficulties by pointing to the “human
factor,” rather than size, training, and equipment.
Ken Pollack attributes its poor performance to
inadequate military effectiveness, which he describes
as the “ability of soldiers and officers to perform
on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions,
and to execute strategies devised by their political

3. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Boulder,
CO: The Westview Press, 2012), 54–55.
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leaders.”4 Trevor Dupuy, in his analysis of Arab army
performance against the Israelis in 1973, suggests
the Iraqis were simply not as tactically proficient as
even the other Arab armies, though he does little to
account for why.5 Anthony Cordesman, on the other
hand, attributes the Iraqi military’s poor combined
arms capabilities to its focus on regime protection
and internal stability.6 Others, like Norvell De Atkine,
would ascribe the Iraqi Army’s failures to a variety of
cultural influences that resulted in an inflexibility that
prohibited effective maneuver warfare.7
Though any full explanation would take all of these
factors into account as well as many others, what any
external partner can do about them remains elusive.
For the United States’ part, security cooperation efforts
have emphasized professionalizing the ISF, which
includes institution building as well as the provision
of training and equipment.8 But limited access for
US personnel, often due to security concerns, and
generally incoherent execution on the part of the Iraqis,
whose complex cultural and political environment

4. Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–
1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 4.
5. Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948–
1974 (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1978), 537.
6. Anthony Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and
Military Lessons (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and
International Studies Press, 2003), 17.
7. Norvell B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East
Quarterly 6, no. 4 (September 1, 1999), https://www.meforum.org
/articles/other/why-arabs-lose-wars.
8. Terrorism and Iran: Defense Challenges in the Middle East, 115th
Cong. (2018) (statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander,
US Central Command).
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places competing demands on their priorities and
resources, have restricted the impact of these efforts.9
None of these difficulties, however, should be a
surprise. A survey of Iraqi military history suggests
a pattern of strengths, weaknesses, and performance
that includes courageous soldiers, cohesive units,
incompetent leaders, divided loyalties, poor combat
support, and weak institutions that have, on occasion,
risen to the defense challenge. If the United States is
going to be more successful in this next round, it will
need to change its approach to better account for
these factors and how they shape the Iraqi Army’s
professional culture.
Determining what needs to change requires a better
understanding of what it means to professionalize
a military force in the Iraqi context. Of course, it is
trivial to say that the word “professional” means
different things to different people. Within Western
cultures the word is often used to signal a high degree
of proficiency or, simply, one is getting paid for work.
In the context of civil-military relations, it is often
used just to convey that the military is subordinate
to civilian authority. But, when considering its own
development, the US military employs a specific
understanding of “professional” that plays a large role
in determining how it organizes itself to fight.10 This
understanding and what it fully entails, however,
are a product of a long history of confronting specific
challenges in a uniquely American context. That
unique history, context, and culture in turn give rise
9. Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges
for the United States (Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia
Press, 2018), 193–194.
10. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP-1: The
Army Profession (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, June 2015).
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to a unique way of war that does not always translate
well into another history, context, and culture.
Given that the United States’ history and context
are not shared by the Iraqis, it should not be surprising
that these efforts to professionalize often fail. Having
said that, the universal nature of warfare settles to
some degree what practices lead to effective militaries
and which ones do not. So despite not sharing a
history, both the Iraqi Army and its US partners share
a desired outcome: a capable military. Addressing
the barriers to developing that capability requires an
understanding of the professional ideal as well as the
historical and cultural barriers to achieving that ideal.
THE MILITARY AS A PROFESSION
A military’s professional culture is part of a broader
set of political and social relationships that give rise
to a particular way of war which accounts for how a
particular military organizes for war and performs
in combat.11 The modern US, if not Western, view
of the military as a profession is heavily influenced
by the views of Samuel Huntington, who argued
that professions are characterized by three features:
expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.
To be a professional in his view, one must first
possess “specialized knowledge and skill in a
significant field of human endeavor,” apply that
knowledge in service to society, and possess a sense
of corporate identity that sets the professional

11. Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press, 2005), 42. Martin Shaw describes a “way of war”
as a “particular way of organizing for war adopted by an actor or
group of actors.”
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apart from the nonprofessional.12 In the military
context, Huntington characterizes that skill as the
“management of violence,” which includes “(1)
organizing, training, and equipping the force; (2) the
planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its
operations in and out of combat.” Moreover, unlike
professions such as medicine and law, the clients of
which are typically individual members of society, the
military’s client is the state, to which it is responsible
for providing expert advice regarding the application
of military force in defense of the society the state
represents.13
Professionalism, of course, is an ideal, and no
occupation is ever entirely professionalized.14 Having
said that, it is not hard to see how such a professional
ideal informs how a military organizes, trains, and
equips itself to manage violence, as well as how it
interacts with the state and civil society in doing so. In
this view, the state, as the client, gives the profession
the autonomy to recruit and certify its members
and regulate their professional activities by a code
of ethics, as well as, most importantly, a monopoly
on applying their respective expertise in the service
of human progress.15 This monopoly, in turn, gives
the profession jurisdiction over the provision of the
relevant social good.16 This jurisdiction makes sense,
12. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press, 1957), 8–10.
13. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11–18.
14. Allan R. Millett, Military Professionalism and Officership
in America (Columbus, OH: Mershon Center of the Ohio State
University, 1979), 2.
15. Millett, Military Professionalism, 3.
16. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pamphlet 360302: The Profession of Arms: The 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures Given at
Trinity College, Cambridge, by Lt.-General Sir John Winthrop Hackett
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as Alan R. Millett observes, because the “profession,
serving the vital interests of man, considers its first
ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the
client.”17 As long as the profession does not violate
that imperative, it should have the trust of the client,
and it should reasonably expect its autonomy over its
jurisdiction to be secure. Or so the theory goes.
This view of professionalism is, of course, Western,
which raises the question whether it can be applied in
non-Western contexts or, if it can, whether it should.
The short answer to both questions is “no.” It would
be futile, as history has repeatedly demonstrated,
to try again to export a Western model of military
effectiveness to the Iraqi Army. But there is an
objective standard here. States want their armies to
win wars. When armies do not do that, then something
has to change. This point suggests that there should be
some way of transferring some level of capability to
armies that exist in different environments.
So though this view of professionalism may be
Western, aspects of it do transcend culture. Expert
knowledge, autonomy, and jurisdiction in service
to a democratically elected civilian government set
conditions for trust between the army and the state
and between the army and the society it defends.
Achieving these conditions do not ensure victory;
however, they are necessary conditions for improving
any army’s military effectiveness. Security cooperation
efforts should thus focus on achieving a level of
professionalism, as described here, for an Iraqi Army
that has only known it by exception. To understand
(Washington, DC: The Pentagon, November 17, 1966), 3. Hackett
stated the “function of the profession of arms is the ordered
application of force in the resolution of a social problem.”
17. Millett, Military Professionalism, 3.
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how, one must first understand how the Iraqi Army’s
history has shaped its culture.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRAQI ARMY
Prehistory of the Iraqi Army
The martial history of the Iraqi Army begins with
the somewhat romanticized Bedouin raiding culture,
which emphasized courage, stealth, and cleverness and
deemphasized direct combat as a way to avoid blood
feuds.18 Islam moderated this identity, as the constant
raiding and subsequent blood feuds made the Arab
tribes vulnerable to the more unified Muslim armies,
which exploited this vulnerability to rapidly expand
the religion on the Arabian Peninsula.19 Thus, for the
first time on such a grand scale, Islam united people in
the region to fight for a cause that transcended narrow
tribal identities and transformed largely unknown
tribal groups from the Arabian Desert into rulers of
the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain.20 Later this
unity would set conditions for pan-Arabism, which
had a profound impact on the Iraqi Army’s identity.
By the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire
had established itself as the dominant power in the
18. Ralph Patai, The Arab Mind, rev. ed. (New York, NY:
Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 86. See also Williamson Murray and
Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic
History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5.
Murray and Woods describe Arab military culture as “resting on
a complex mix of myths and notions of bravery, tribal loyalty,
raiding parties, and martyrdom” which were both features of that
culture and measures of its effectiveness.
19. Patai, The Arab Mind, 222.
20. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, NY: Vintage
Books, 1993), 192.
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Muslim world, ensuring its place as a key influencer
in the armies of almost every Middle Eastern state,
certainly Iraq. For much of their history, the Ottoman
armies were often more modern—and more effective—
than their European counterparts. After some decline
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
Ottomans undertook a modernization effort beginning
in 1826 and invited European advisors, one of whom
was the Prussian general Helmuth von Moltke (the
elder), to assist with military modernization.21 The
result was a competent, modern army, but one whose
soldiers often loathed the empire they were supposed
to defend.22 This loathing was certainly the case of
Iraqis in the ranks, who often joined secret Arab
nationalist organizations, even while they served the
empire.23
The Modern Iraqi Army
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at
the end of World War I, the British took control over
Iraq’s boundaries, government, and military under
its postwar mandate. After a tribal revolt in the south
in 1920, the British installed King Faysal, a Sunni
leader from Saudi Arabia, in 1921 and established
a constitution that would integrate Iraq’s disparate
population under a partially, at least, democratic
government.24 Concurrently, it also established a small
Iraqi Army capable of maintaining state authority
21. Keegan, History of Warfare, 32–39.
22. Sydney Nettleton Fisher and William Ochsenwald, The
Middle East: A History (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1990),
161–162.
23. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York, NY:
Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., 1935), 46.
24. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 22–24.
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over an often restive population but not large enough
to challenge British rule.25 As a hedge against the
uncertain effectiveness of that army, the British more
directly relied on Assyrian levies to see to their specific
interests and used the Royal Air Force to bolster both
the levies and the Iraqi Army.26
Recruitment, in the beginning, was difficult. A year
after establishment, the army had only grown to 3,618
personnel, far short of the modest initial 6,000-soldier
target.27 The lower ranks were, for the most part, Shia,
though members of other sects did join. Much of the
mostly Sunni officer corps was composed of former
Ottoman officials, mostly Sunni, who had previously
participated in the Arab revolt against the Turks
and returned to Iraq to take part in building the new
state.28 At the outset, the British had little trust in
and less regard for the Ottomans, so they limited the
number they commissioned to 250 and excluded any
who had participated in the revolt of 1920 or opposed
the British in Syria. Conscious of Iraq’s diversity, the
British tried to make up the difference by reserving
positions for Iraq’s Shia tribes, but largely made up
the difference with recruits from well-off urban, Sunni
families. So, despite attempts at integration, the officer

25. Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s Armed
Forces: An Analytical History (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 20.
26. Paul P. J. Hemphill, “The Formation of the Iraqi Army,
1921–1933,” in The Integration of Modern Iraq, Abbas Kelidar, ed.
(New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 94; Marr, Modern History
of Iraq, 24–26.
27. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 21–22.
28. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 26. I owe the point regarding
these officers’ participation in the Arab revolt against the Turks to
an anonymous observer.
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corps remained largely urban and Sunni, much like
the civilian leadership, and fervently nationalist.29
As a result, the Iraqi Army started off with an
identity crisis. The British wanted a small, indigenous
force that could share the security burden of
controlling unrest and securing the borders as a means
to realizing Britain’s other interests. Iraqis, however,
wanted a much larger army capable of maintaining
order; building a national identity that would “make
Iraqis out of peasants, nomads and townsmen alike,
of Sunni and Shii, of Arabs and Kurds;” as well as
play an important role as part of the larger Arab
nation.30 Perhaps more importantly, this new Iraqi
soldier would become the “new model Iraqi citizen”
who would take the ideals of patriotism, loyalty, and
national service into civilian life.31
Building this identity would require a substantially
larger army than the approximately 9,000 ground
troops the British thought suited for Iraq’s security
needs. So, in 1927, the Iraqi parliament introduced
a conscription bill to expand the army. The British
opposed it because they believed Iraq did not have
the financial or administrative resources to manage
a large force. They, however, were not alone in their
opposition. Nationalists opposed it because they saw
the army as British-controlled, Shia opposed it because
they saw the army as another mechanism for Sunni
domination, and tribal sheikhs opposed it because
they thought conscription would undermine their
tribal authority. Thus by the time of independence
in 1932, the Iraqi Army was still relatively small,
29. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 98–99; Marr,
Modern History of Iraq, 25–26.
30. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 92–100.
31. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 24.

11

numbering around 11,500.32 With independence,
however, the expansionists won and, by 1936, the Iraqi
Army had grown to twice its original size, forcing the
government to recruit officers from “promising sons
of poorer families” and thus breaking class barriers
that previously disincentivized wider participation.33
Despite that expansion, the building of the Iraqi Army
did not have quite the nationalizing effect desired.
Part of the army’s failure to act as a nationalizing
element lay with its culture. Iraqi society then, much as
it is today, was essentially “personality-oriented and
bound to a considerable extent by patronage and interpersonal ties.”34 As a result, institutional autonomy
would often be hostage to the other social ties its
members had. For senior leaders, that could mean
prioritizing the political needs of particular patrons
within the government over that of the institution. For
those farther from the top, it meant seeing the Iraqi
Army as a means to obtaining government patronage
and resources. Loyalties, however, remained with the
tribal, sectarian, or local community.
Despite these diverse loyalties, the army did play
an important nationalizing role. The army was a
venue for upward mobility for both those who would
opt in to the Iraqi state and enforcers who brought
back into line those who would not. The most iconic of
the army’s early enforcing roles came when it fought
the Assyrians, who had become a well-armed, but
recalcitrant, minority population that refused to submit
to Baghdad.35 The fighting was limited, consisting of
one minor skirmish that quickly degenerated into
32.
33.
34.
35.

Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 92–97.
Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 100.
Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 100.
Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 39.
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mass killings and looting of Assyrian villages.36 But
the Iraqi people saw this as the army’s first real victory
over forces of instability. The returning soldiers—
especially their commander, the Kurdish general
Bakr Sidqi—were greeted as heroes. The result was
greater interest from Kurds and tribesmen in serving
in the military, which set the stage for the passage of a
conscription bill.37
These events established the emerging army’s
identity as either patron or punisher. For non-Sunnis,
like Bakr Sidqi, opting in was a means of obtaining
state patronage, which enabled the building of Sunni
patronage networks. For those such as the Assyrians
who chose not to buy in, the army functioned as a
punisher and brought such would-be rebels in line.
Thus, the Iraqi military leadership saw for themselves
an integral role in ensuring popular compliance with
Baghdad’s rule and as a check when that rule took on
a character that the army felt was detrimental to its or
the nation’s interests.
Ironically, the first such check came in 1936 against
the government of Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi
at the hands of Bakr Sidqi, now commander of the
Iraqi armed forces, and Hikmat Sulayman, a former
supporter of Hashimi’s who had been denied the
key post of minister of the interior.38 Frustrated by
Hashimi’s dictatorial moves, which included using
the army to crack down on opposition, as well as
a recalcitrance to modernizing and reforming the
36. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 107. In one
case, Iraqi forces killed around 315 civilians who had huddled
around a police station in the city of Simele for protection; Marr,
Modern History of Iraq, 39.
37. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 40.
38. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 46.
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economy and military, Sidqi and Sulayman overthrew
him but left the monarchy in place.39
Unfortunately, Sulayman and Sidqi’s government
did not last long either. Sidqi, being a Kurd, feared
Iraq’s participation in a pan-Arab state would
marginalize the Kurdish people, and thus did little to
advance the pan-Arab agenda.40 As a result, he was
assassinated in 1937 on the orders of Arab nationalist
officers.41 This ushered in military rule until 1941, when
the British intervened after another coup replaced the
pro-British government with one sympathetic to the
Nazis. When that government tried to prevent the
British from moving troops into Basra, the British
military intervened. With a small number of troops,
the British military defeated the Iraqi Army in under
30 days and reinstalled the pro-British government,
which allowed the British to maintain control of Iraq
until after World War II.42 As Trevor Dupuy observes,
though by 1941 the Iraqi Army had been the longeststanding army in the Arab world, it was “an Army
without much confidence in itself,” having been
repeatedly beaten by smaller, often less well-equipped
adversaries.43
FIGHTING AGAINST THE ISRAELIS
The Iraqi Army’s first action after World War II
was to participate in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, in
which it sent a sizeable force of four infantry brigades
and an armored battalion, along with support
39. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 43–46; Marashi and Salama,
Iraq’s Armed Forces, 46–49.
40. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 52.
41. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 48.
42. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 54–55.
43. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 18.
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personnel, to fight under the Arab Liberation Army.
The Iraqi Army’s performance in this conflict was
entirely consistent with its past. As Pollack observes,
senior leadership was unimaginative and uncreative,
junior officers showed little initiative, and soldiers
were poorly trained and uncommitted. Having said
that, Iraqi units fought hard and showed a great deal
of cohesion and courage. Perhaps surprisingly, the
Iraqis also appeared to do well in logistics, having
adequately moved a fairly large force hundreds of
miles and supported it without relying on allies.44
The Iraqis largely missed the 1967 war, due
largely to readiness deficiencies, the speed of Israeli
operations, and devastating air attacks by the Israeli
air force against the token force they did try to
send.45 This pattern repeated itself when the Iraqis
entered the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this war, Iraq
sent a large force consisting of 2 armored divisions,
2 infantry brigades, 12 artillery battalions, and a
Special Forces brigade, totaling approximately 60,000
men, 700 tanks, 500 armored personnel carriers, and
over 200 artillery pieces. Here again, Iraqi logistics
performed well and, this time, moved a corps-sized
unit over 1,000 kilometers in just a few days and
sustained it for several weeks.46 Moreover, the Iraqis
had some tactical success when elements of the Iraqi
3rd Armored Division showed up on the Israeli flank,
forcing the Israelis to stop their advance on Damascus
and deal with the threat the Iraqi forces represented.
The Israelis never recovered their momentum, and the
delay effectively stopped their advance to Damascus.47
44.
45.
46.
47.

Pollack, Arabs at War, 155.
Pollack, Arabs at War, 167.
Pollack, Arabs at War, 167–168.
Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 468.
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The Iraqis owe this victory more to accident than
intention. Up until contact, they were not aware of
their proximity to the Israelis, having failed to send out
any reconnaissance or engage in tactical intelligence
collection.48 Over the next few days, the Iraqis would
haphazardly try to push the Israelis back. Rather than
attempt to maneuver around the exhausted Israeli
formations, they drove straight into the trap set for
them by the Israeli commander. Three days later, as a
result of subsequent skirmishes with the Israelis, the
Iraqis had lost 80 percent of the tanks it had committed
to battle.49
FIGHTING AGAINST THE KURDS
The Iraqi Army arguably had more success against
the Kurds, but certainly at a much higher cost than it
should have paid. As Sidqi’s overthrow demonstrated,
the inclusion of Kurds in Iraq set up an irreconcilable
tension in Iraqi politics: Baghdad’s moves toward
Arab nationalism alienated the Kurds, many Shia
encouraged their own separatist tendencies, and any
actor’s moves toward an independent Iraqi identity
alienated the pan-Arab nationalists.50 Moreover,
Kurdish aspirations for true independence, frustrated
by the Treaty of Lausanne, set additional conditions
for tensions with Iraq’s neighbors, all of whom had
their own restive Kurdish populations.51
174.

48. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 467–468; Pollack, Arabs at War,

49. Pollack, Arabs at War, 169.
50. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London,
UK: I. B. Taurius, 1996), 142–144.
51. Edmund Ghareeb, “The Kurdish Issue,” in Iraq: Its History,
People, and Politics, ed. Shams Inati (Amherst, NY: Humanity
Books, 2003), 168; McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 142.
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Even under the British mandate, the Iraqi Army
had often and unsuccessfully confronted Kurdish
separatists.52 As a result, the new government had little
appetite for more fighting, so relations were relatively
quiet from Iraq’s independence to the 1960s. In fact,
Kurdish participation in the army increased after the
successes of Bakr Sidqi against the Assyrian levies
and tribes.53 The situation changed in 1958 when Abd
al-Karim Qasim overthrew the Iraqi government in yet
another coup, ending the British-backed monarchy.
Qasim then reached out to the Soviets, who were more
than happy to assist with Iraq’s military expansion.54
Ironically, the Kurds originally supported Qasim’s
rise to power, believing that he would support greater
autonomy and independence for the Iraqi-Kurdish
region. But despite an apparent desire to do so, Qasim
could not find an appropriate balance between the
pan-Arabists and the Kurds. To make matters worse,
he also imposed land-reform measures that would
have distributed more than half of tribal-held lands
in Kurdistan as well as the rest of Iraq. As a result,
the Kurds, under the leadership of mullah Mustafa
al-Barzani, revolted.55 In September 1961, fighting
started after Barzani’s peshmerga ambushed an army
convoy.56
The first round of fighting ended in a stalemate.
Though the Kurds were able to take almost all of Iraqi
Kurdistan within two weeks, they were not able to
hold it. As Pollack notes, they were “unprepared for
serious combat” and retreated to the mountains for
52. Hemphill, “Formation of the Iraqi Army,” 105.
53. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 40.
54. Pollack, Arabs at War, 156.
55. Pollack, Arabs at War, 156–157; Marr, Modern History of
Iraq, 105; McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 306–307.
56. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 105–106.
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the winter.57 The Iraqi Army’s response, however,
was not much more effective. The army maintained a
defensive posture, garrisoned major Kurdish towns,
and conducted operations largely to keep roads and
supply lines open, hoping the rebellion would collapse
from internal conflict, characteristic of inter-Kurdish
politics. Such a strategy was, of course, manpowerintensive, and eventually three-quarters of the Iraqi
Army was in Kurdistan.58
Unfortunately for the Iraqi Army, its operations
were characteristically indiscriminate, and Iraqi
soldiers frequently killed civilians and looted Kurdish
villages. Predictably, this practice had the effect
of encouraging support for Barzani, even from his
enemies, and reduced the likelihood of the rebellion
falling apart. The Iraqi Army’s defensive posture
also gave the Kurds the opportunity to regroup and
establish external sources of supply from Kurds in Iran
and Turkey, as well as the Shah of Iran, whom Qasim
needlessly alienated.59 As Pollack observes, “Thus by
taking control of the major roads at night and using
secondary routes that the army did not patrol during
the day, the Kurds had plenty of access to the supplies
they needed. Meanwhile, the systematic destruction
of Kurdish villages by Iraqi air and ground forces
ensured a steady flow of new recruits and Kurdish
deserters into Barzani’s camp.”60
In 1963, frustrated with Qasim’s passive strategy,
elements of the army initiated a coup that brought
Abd al-Salam Arif and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to
power. Even though Arif was not a member, it brought
57. Pollack, Arabs at War, 157.
58. Pollack, Arabs at War, 158.
59. Pollack, Arabs at War, 158–159.
60. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 92; Pollack,
Arabs at War, 159.
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the Baath Party to power as well.61 Under the Baath
regime, the newly empowered Iraqi Army conducted
a series of offensives against the Kurds, none of which
were successful. The failure of the first offensive
was largely due to tactical reasons. The Iraqi Army
characteristically stuck to the roads and conducted
frontal assaults against Kurdish positions with little
reconnaissance, maneuver, or flank protection.
Unfortunately for the Kurds, all they could do was
conduct ambushes, and thus they were not able to
effectively capitalize on their successes or the Iraqi
Army’s weaknesses. As a result, this first offensive
ended in stalemate, due in no small part to the Kurds’
ability to get supplies from Turkish Kurds and Iran.62
When the Iraqi Army undertook its second
offensive in the spring of 1965, it had effectively
removed the Kurds’ external support by getting
the Turks to conduct an offensive against their own
Kurdish rebels and Iran to agree to stop supplying the
Iraqi Kurds as well as block peshmerga who might
try to cross the border. But the Iraqi Army’s tactics
did not change, and the Kurds again defeated the
army. It tried again the next spring but, despite some
tactical success, lost again. The final defeat came when
Kurds attacked a large Iraqi Army formation that had
established a camp in a valley but was not defending
the surrounding heights. The Kurds descended and
killed more than 2,000 Iraqi soldiers before they fled,
leaving much of their heavy equipment behind. The
Iraqis tried again in March 1970 with little success. So,

61. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 92–93; Pollack,
Arabs at War, 159.
62. Pollack, Arabs at War, 160–161.
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in March 1970, Baghdad granted autonomy and other
concessions to the Kurds.63
The resulting peace, however, did not last. After
four years of Baghdad’s inconsistent implementation
of the 1970 agreement, coupled with Barzani’s belief
that Iran and the United States would support him,
the Kurds went on the offensive.64 In the intervening
four years, in addition to making deals with Iran, the
United States, and Israel for support, he had built
up the peshmerga to approximately 50,000–60,000
regulars and another 50,000 irregulars. The large
number of troops convinced Barzani that he could
adopt conventional military operations and avoid
the stalemates of the past by taking the Iraqi Army
head-on. But Baghdad had also built up its strength
during the same time and had 90,000 troops, 1,200
tanks and armored personnel carriers, and 200 combat
aircraft arrayed against the Kurds. Moreover, it had
learned some tactical lessons from its earlier failures
against the Kurds and Israelis.65
Though the Iraqis by this point had acquired
equipment and some advisers from the Soviet Union,
they never fully embraced Soviet military doctrine.
In fact, after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Iraqis
had abandoned most of what they had learned from
the Russians and sent all but a few technical advisers
home. In their place they welded Soviet and British
practices and introduced a few innovations of their
own. First, they resolved many of the logistics issues
that had allowed the Kurds’ starvation strategy to
work. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they
abandoned frontal assaults and instead adopted a
63. Pollack, Arabs at War, 162–164.
64. McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 327–338.
65. Pollack, Arabs at War, 176–177.
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doctrine of “overwhelming firepower.” As Pollack
describes it, “[r]ather than charging a position as had
been their previous practice, Iraqi forces were trained
not to assault a well-defended objective at all, but to
dig in immediately and then call in massive firepower
from tanks, artillery, mortars, multiple rocket
launchers, and close support aircraft to obliterate the
source of resistance.”66
The implementation of these tactics, as Pollack
observes, was not elegant, “but with the cooperation
of the peshmerga, they got the job done.”67 Instead of
retreating back into the mountains as they had done
in the past, the peshmerga tried to take the Iraqis
head-on. The result was disastrous for the Kurds. Had
it not been for Iranian intervention, which included
heavy weapons and, later, troops, they would have
been defeated. Saddam Hussein, who was then vice
president, broke the stalemate in 1975 by negotiating
a deal with the Iranians which included a number of
Iraqi territorial concessions codified in the Algiers
Agreement of 1975 in exchange for their withdrawal
of support for the Kurds. Without that support, the
Kurds were quickly defeated.68
THE BAATH PARTY
After the Baath Party reclaimed power in 1968, it
made a number of deliberate moves to prevent the
history that had enabled its return from repeating itself.
That history consisted of three elements: infiltrating
the armed forces; using the armed forces to bring the
party to power; and then asserting control over the
armed forces once in power. So that would not happen
66. Pollack, Arabs at War, 177–178.
67. Pollack, Arabs at War, 179.
68. McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 338.
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again, the Baath Party first placed the military under
the control of the Revolutionary Command Council,
which would become the ultimate decision-making
body in Iraq and which served to control and eliminate
opposition within the government, the military, and
society at-large. This move was significant. Before,
the Iraqi Army essentially had veto power over the
government and over any matter it considered within
its or the state’s interest. Now, that veto belonged to
civilians, guaranteeing their unchecked domination of
the political process.69
Second, the Baath Party immediately expelled or
executed a number of officers who were not members
of the party. It took special interest in purging
members of the Iraqi Communist Party, which at the
time was the only other secular party that could put
together a cross-sectarian opposition to the Baathists.
They continued over the next two years to “rotate,
expel, or retire” any officers they deemed a threat to
party control. Some 2,000 officers were purged during
this time. To further control the officer corps, they
prohibited any political activity not endorsed by the
Baath Party under penalty of death.
Third, by the end of 1970, the party had replaced the
expelled officers with 3,000 Baathists, at various ranks,
effectively—and intentionally—providing the party
with an alternative chain of command that reported
to party headquarters rather than the formal military
chain of command.70 Essentially, the party politicized
the military in order to keep it out of politics.71
69. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 110–112.
70. Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 112–113.
71. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 56–57. These
authors note that in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the SixDay War with Israel in 1967, the Baath Party did try to pay some
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In the years between the Baath Party takeover and
the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Iraq undertook a
major military expansion and reform overseen by
Saddam Hussein, who was vice president for most of
this time. First, he established a 150,000-man popular
army to handle domestic security functions, providing
a check on the military as well as freeing it for other
missions. Second, and in part because of the army’s
poor performance in the 1973 war, he expanded and
modernized the Iraqi military, doubling its size from
6 to 12 divisions, and purchased 1,600 modern T-72s
and BMP-1s as well as over 200 fighters and fighterbombers from the Soviet Union.72 Meanwhile, he
continued to purge senior leadership and promoted
those loyal to him in their place, regardless of their
competence. Further, he frequently rotated those he
appointed to prevent them from building loyalty
among their men.73 This well-equipped but poorly led
army would be the one with which Saddam would go
to war with Iran.
FIGHTING AGAINST THE IRANIANS
After the fall of the Shah in 1979, militant Kurds,
who managed to flee into Iran despite the border
closure, took advantage of the chaos and crossed
attention to professionalizing the military; however, ensuring
political loyalty took priority.
72. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 59–60; Pollack,
Arabs at War, 182. Murray and Woods make the point that new
equipment did not translate into new capabilities. Two years after
receiving four squadrons of MiG-23s, only two were operational
due to pilot and maintenance-crew shortages.
73. Pollack, Arabs at War, 182. Pollack provides the following
numbers: Iraq—2,750 tanks, 1,040 artillery pieces, and 330 fighter
bombers; and Iran—approximately 500 operational tanks, 300
functional artillery pieces, and less than 100 operable aircraft.
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back into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the
revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini
called for the spread of the revolution to the Shia of
Iraq. These dual provocations, coupled with Saddam’s
perception of a weakened Iranian military due to
purges by the new regime, presented Saddam with an
opportunity to reverse the concessions made in 1975.
At first, he tried an indirect approach and sought to
destabilize Khomeini’s government through support
to its opposition. When this effort failed to get the
desired results, he decided to take matters into his
own hands and, on September 23, ordered the Iraqi
Army to invade Iran.74
The offensive did not go well for long as the
army tried to defeat the Iranians with the same
overwhelming-firepower tactics that worked with the
Kurds. Despite the fact they heavily outnumbered the
Iranian forces by a ratio of one-to-five in tanks and
a ratio of one-to-three in artillery and aircraft, Iraqi
forces would halt at the first sign of resistance (no
matter how small), dig in, and blast the objective. The
main reason for this state of affairs, of course, was
leadership: Saddam’s politicization of the army, which
included putting family members and loyalists with
no military experience into senior positions, meant
that “virtually none of Iraq’s senior generals . . . had
the experience and understanding to command large
forces.”75 There were no attempts to take advantage
of the Iraqi forces’ superior numbers and mobility to
outmaneuver the Iranian forces.
Moreover, there were few attempts to conduct
tactical intelligence and reconnaissance operations
74. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 181–182; Murray and Woods,
The Iran-Iraq War, 97.
75. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 62.
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to locate the Iranian units so they could be
outmaneuvered. While Iraqi logistics performed well
and soldiers again “showed tenacity, courage, and
endurance in combat,” they did not get far.76 After
two months of fighting, the Iraqis had only advanced
about 65 kilometers.77 As a result, it did not take long
for Iran to take those kilometers back during offensives
conducted in the spring of 1982.78
In July 1982, the Iranians decided to invade
Iraqi territory and attempted to seize Basra while
inspiring a Shia uprising against Saddam Hussein.79
But invading Iraq was very different than defending
Iran. Iraqis were now fighting on Iraqi soil. In addition
to increasing the determination of the average Iraqi
soldier, it afforded the Iraqi Army better lines of
communication, which it amplified with fortifications
in depth. Moreover, Saddam had replaced 200–300
loyal but incompetent senior leaders with those
who were at least competent.80 Taking these factors
together, the Iraqis were able to stall four Iranian
offensives around Basra undertaken from 1982 to
1986. Furthermore, Khomeini’s hoped-for revolt never
happened, demonstrating that even under Saddam,
a sense of Arab, if not Iraqi, nationality superseded
religious affiliation in determining individual loyalty.81
While the Iranians’ limitations in mobility and supply
accounted for their failure in part, much of the credit
goes to Saddam’s newly professionalized General
76. Pollack, Arabs at War, 192–193.
77. Pollack, Arabs at War, 187–190.
78. Anthony Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The
Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO:
The Westview Press, 1990), 138–140.
79. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 192.
80. Pollack, Arabs at War, 206–209.
81. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 169.
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Staff, who were able to concentrate forces and rapidly
respond to Iranian attacks.82 Pollack notes, however,
that the “dog that did not bark” was “Iraqi tactical
effectiveness.” He observes the following:
Despite Herculean labors of Iraq’s general staff to improve
their army, there was no discernable enhancement in
tactical competence. Iraqi units continued to perform well
when sitting behind their impressive fortifications and
blasting away at the Iranians, but—as the failure of both of
their operational-level counteroffensives demonstrated—
they remained hapless at basically all other operations.
Iraqi tactical commanders had displayed all of the
recurrent problems of passivity, inflexibility, dogmatism,
poor combined-arms integration, unwillingness to
maneuver, and mismanagement of information.83

To lift the siege against Basra, Iraqi forces had to go
on the offensive, a task of which the army was not
capable. To build that capability, beginning in 1982,
Saddam’s generals expanded the Republican Guard
and began to promote on merit. They filled vacant
slots with drafted college students and soldiers from
other units who had demonstrated capability.84 By
the beginning of 1988, the Republican Guard had
expanded from 7 brigades to 28, with a total of 100,000
troops who were given the best weapons, including
Iraq’s newly acquired Soviet T-72s as well as modern
European and South African artillery and advanced
Soviet air defense weapons. The Iraqis also made
improvements in naval infantry, chemical weapons,
and even tactical intelligence, including the use of

82. Pollack, Arabs at War, 224.
83. Pollack, Arabs at War, 224.
84. Pollack, Arabs at War, 219.
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night-vision devices, radio intercept and electronic
warfare, as well as tactical counter-battery radar.85
Despite being overwhelmingly Sunni, however,
the expansion of the Republican Guard and emphasis
on merit over loyalty played on Saddam’s paranoia.
As a result, he created the Special Republican Guard
to handle the mission of protecting the regime.86 This
is just one example of the kind of layering Saddam
imposed on the various security services to ensure no
one service grew powerful enough to challenge his
government.87 As Cordesman observes, “Many Iraqi
combat elements were better at watching each other,
and at suppressing the Iraqi people, than at fighting a
foreign opponent.”88
The signature innovation, however, was to
provide detailed scripting of military operations.
Since previous attempts to encourage initiative,
creativity, and aggressiveness had failed, the General
Staff decided to plan operations in minute detail. As
a result, they wrote the elements typically missing
from Iraqi operations—coordination, maneuver, and
innovation—into the “scripts,” which the assigned
forces would then rehearse until “they could perform
each task from memory.”89 The General Staff kept the
duration of these operations short and the objectives
of these operations limited to “keep unforeseen events
to a minimum.”90
85. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 354–
357; Pollack, Arabs at War, 218–220.
86. Pollack, Arabs at War, 220.
87. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 234–235. See also Ibrahim
al-Marashi, “The Family, Clan, and Tribal Dynamics of Saddam’s
Security and Intelligence Network,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 2 (April 2003), 202–211.
88. Cordesman, The Iraq War, 16–17.
89. Pollack, Arabs at War, 220–221.
90. Pollack, Arabs at War, 230.
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The plan worked. The first offensive to retake the
al-Faw peninsula caught the Iranians off guard and “in
thirty-five hours, the Iraqis had secured the peninsula
and captured much of the Iranian equipment intact.”91
In the end, five Iraqi offensives destroyed Iran’s
ground forces and forced the Iranians to accept a
ceasefire. Though the Iraqis never fully overcame
the issues that kept them from defeating the Iranians
inside Iran, they did figure out a way to adapt to
those shortcomings and get the most out of the forces
they had. With detailed planning combined with
improved intelligence, some of which was provided
by the United States, the Iraqi Army was able to push
back the Iranians, who had no choice but to accept a
cease-fire.92
According to an unclassified Defense Intelligence
Agency assessment, the Iraqi Army at the end of
the Iran-Iraq War was a “battle-hardened force
capable of conducting effective offensive and
defensive operations. The Iraqi Army polished its
offensive capability, achieving good results during
final operations against the Iranians.”93 What that
assessment ignored was the important role chemical
weapons played in breaking up the Iranian Basra
offensive as well in the Iraqi Army’s final push to
drive the Iranians out of Iraq.94 So, though the army’s
subsequent performance against the United States
in 1991 suggests that assessment was somewhat
optimistic, Pollack does observe it had a “reasonably
good ability to perform set-piece offensives and static
91. Pollack, Arabs at War, 225.
92. Pollack, Arabs at War, 225–230.
93. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, AIA-DS1-90: Identifying the Iraqi Threat and How They Fight (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, September 1990), 2.
94. Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 228, 294, and 339.
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defensive operations” as well as good, especially by
regional standards, logistic and combat engineering
capabilities. But it remained, as it had since its
founding, “almost entirely incapable of fighting fluid,
maneuver battles.”95
FIGHTING AGAINST THE AMERICANS
In many ways, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was
necessitated by the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War.
Though Saddam claimed victory, the Iraqi economy
was under a great deal of stress from almost a
decade at war and, moreover, Saddam’s army
had expanded to approximately one million men,
with commensurate growth in sophisticated—and
expensive—equipment.96 At the same time, Iraq was
also saddled with sizeable foreign debt, the repayment
of which amounted to over 50 percent of oil revenues
in 1990. Austerity measures, such as downsizing
the government, especially the military, simply
exacerbated unemployment and further stressed the
economy, thus threatening the patronage networks
Saddam relied on to maintain power.97 At first,
Saddam turned to his gulf neighbors, especially Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, to help him out of this economic
mess by backing oil price increases, forgiving the
debt Iraq owed them, and giving to Iraq’s economic
reconstruction. When they refused, Saddam invaded
Kuwait.98
95. Pollack, Arabs at War, 264.
96. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958:
From Revolution to Dictatorship (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2003),
283–284.
97. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251.
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As is well-known, the initial invasion of Kuwait
went well for the Iraqi Army. Essentially driving
down the Basra-Jahra highway, the army brushed
aside Kuwaiti defenses at the Mutla Ridge and seized
Kuwait City in less than 24 hours. It employed the
same formula that led to success in the Iran-Iraq War:
elite units, acting on well-rehearsed and detailed
plans, were able to achieve success before unforeseen
events could disrupt the script.99 But as is also wellknown, the resulting Iraqi defense of Kuwait did not
go so well.
The reasons for that failure begin with bad
strategic assumptions. First, the Iraqi military
believed the “brief, sharp clashes” that characterized
its way of war would be sufficient to defend against
a casualty-averse US military and it would be able to
survive whatever damage the coalition air campaign
inflicted.100 It also underestimated the coalition’s
logistic and maneuver capabilities, which enabled
the “left hook” that caught Iraqi forces by surprise.101
Exacerbating that surprise were the high numbers
of casualties it suffered as a result of the coalition air
campaign. The campaign, which started January 17,
1991, caused the loss of approximately 150,000 troops,
many of whom deserted, and 20–30 percent of the
Iraqi Army’s armored forces by the time the ground
war began on February 24. Had the Iraqi Army been
able to collect tactical intelligence and maneuver in
response to it, it may have still been able to put up a
successful defense. But those were not capabilities the
Iraqis ever really possessed and, as a result, the whole
thing was over in about 100 hours.102
99. Pollack, Arabs at War, 236.
100. Pollack, Arabs at War, 237, 257.
101. Pollack, Arabs at War, 239.
102. Pollack, Arabs at War, 246–248.
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The real challenge for Saddam came after the
war when Shia and Kurdish provinces revolted.103
The rebellion in the south started shortly after the
ceasefire, on March 1, when a retreating Iraqi soldier
fired a tank round at a picture of Saddam. The revolt
quickly spread and, by March 8, it controlled most of
the provincial towns south of Baghdad. The rebellion
in the north began shortly after the one in the south.
On March 4, sparked by the shooting of a deserter in
the town of Ranya, another rebellion rapidly spread,
though this one was much better organized, thanks to
the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.104
Just as quickly as they had spread, both rebellions
were crushed. The response in the south was especially
brutal, with probably more than 100,000 civilian deaths
and extensive damage to homes and infrastructure.
The response was similarly brutal in the north and
caused a massive refugee problem, with up to two
million displaced. The growing humanitarian crisis
forced the international community to take action and
impose the northern and southern no-fly zones as well
as create a safe haven in the north, defended in part
by US forces. At the same time, the peshmerga, who
were better organized and equipped than the rebels
in the south, were able to drive the Iraqi Army from
major cities in northern Iraq, including Dahuk, Zakho,
Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, encouraging the return of the
refugees. Likely because he did not want a renewed
insurgency in Kurdistan, Saddam agreed to pull
back to a defensive line, effectively establishing an
103. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, GEN (USMC
Retired), Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of
Iraq (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 55.
104. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 228–230.
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autonomous Kurdish zone.105 Thus by the time the Iraqi
Army had to think about facing the Americans again
in 2003, it had returned to its focus on controlling civil
unrest, an effort that was led by loyal but incompetent
officers who subordinated their professional judgment
to Saddam’s whims.
To defeat the invading coalition in 2003, Saddam’s
generals proposed a “Russian-style defense in depth”
where the tribes would function like Russian partisans,
bleeding the invading forces as they crossed a bleak
desert, which they compared to the Russian snows
that defeated Napoleon and Hitler. If the Americans
got to Baghdad, the Republican Guard would then
finish them off, employing the same kind of in-depth
fortifications they had had against the Iranians.
Though such a strategy may have worked, Saddam,
ironically, thought its reliance on insurgency was
“foreign.”106
Additionally, he was concerned that arming the
same population that had rebelled against him in the
1990s would encourage further revolt. The Fedayeen
Saddam, which he formed in 1994, were supposed
to take on restive populations. They were given
small arms and the mission to protect Baath Party
headquarters and other critical sites. Their intent was
to control (or at least contain) any uprising until the
Republican Guard could get there to crush it. In fact,
the Fedayeen were organized as a counterinsurgent
force.107 Thus, “[w]hile the army languished,
development of militia and paramilitary forces
for internal security took on great importance.”108
105.
106.
107.
108.
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Saddam eventually tried to create a one-million man
popular army that would make each Iraqi city its own
“fortress,” hampering, if not stopping, an invading
force before it could reach Baghdad. This army never
materialized and, in the end, the insurgence part of
the strategy consisted of Fedayeen raids on coalition
lines of communication.109
As far as Iraq’s conventional forces went, when the
invasion started the Iraqi Army remained deployed in
its peacetime positions, which were focused mainly
eastward, toward Iran and Kurdistan. For those units
that were oriented south, desertions and US air strikes
prohibited them from mounting an effective defense.
When Saddam tried to reinforce them with Republican
Guards, coalition air assets ground their movement to
a halt. Thus, the Iraqi defense quickly lost coherence
and, despite some successful engagements, mostly
near Nasiriyah, it was not able to stop the US drive
toward Baghdad and prevent the fall of the regime.110
Cordesman sums up the Iraqi failure well:
Iraq never succeeded in exploiting its water barriers with
any meaningful success. It left major gaps in its defenses
of the Karbala Gap, and southwestern approaches to
Baghdad. It could not improvise an effective defense
of the road from al Kut to Baghdad in the east. And it
continued to commit its Republican Guard piecemeal to
the defenses of the approaches to Baghdad against both
the 5th Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in
a manner that largely destroyed them and deprived the
regime of the ability to create a cohesive defense of the
city.111
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REBUILDING UNDER THE AMERICANS
Not since the British mandate has the Iraqi Army
had such a close relationship with a foreign military.
Given one of the first acts of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) was to disband the Iraqi military, the
Americans were in some ways in the same position
the British were in 1921: starting from scratch to build
a small force (though it was intended to be bigger than
the original British version) capable of maintaining
internal stability and defending Iraq’s borders against
external threats.112
Just as the British tried to build the first Iraqi
Army with former Ottoman officers, the CPA tried to
build the new Iraqi Army with officers from the army
they had just disbanded. But they conditioned that
participation by making it explicit returning officers
and soldiers would not necessarily return at their
previous rank; instead, they would be placed based on
their assessed competence. In many ways this made
sense. Developing a professional army along the lines
of the American model required that position, rank,
and promotion be based on merit, which includes
dimensions of practical and moral competence. After
all, if professionalism depends on expertise, then it is
the experts who should be in charge of the profession.
As a result, many officers either did not return or
were not allowed to join and were thus left vulnerable
to recruitment by insurgent and sectarian forces.113
Many who did return were later ousted in a highly
politicized de-Baathification process that enabled the
112. Patricia Brasier, LTCOL (USMC, Retired), But Ma’am, the
Security: The Manning of the New Iraqi Army (West Conshohocken,
PA: Infinity Publishing, 2008), 1.
113. Brasier, But Ma’am, 12.
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removal of competent officers in service to sectarian
political ends.114
Moreover, the comparison with the British was not
lost on the Iraqis. Like the British effort in 1921, many
Iraqis viewed the US effort as one of an occupying
power trying to build a military that suited its interests
over those of the Iraqi state. As a result, when the new
Iraqi Army came into being, there was a “trust deficit”
among both senior civilian leaders and the Iraqi
people.
When Iraq regained sovereignty in June 2004, the
new Iraqi political leadership regarded the military
much the same way their predecessors did: as a force
to keep Iraq’s various factions in line and as a potential
threat to the government as well as to their own
leadership positions. Thus, loyalty again became as
important as, if not more important than, competence
when selecting personnel for key senior positions.
The difference this time, however, was there was
no strongman who could centrally disperse positions,
roles, and salaries that encouraged loyalty to a single,
central government. Rather, Iraqi ministry formation,
especially for the security ministries, was a sectarian
free-for-all among Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, as well as
various parties within each of those factions.115 The
result was severe internal competition over roles and
positions at the expense of institution building.
The collapse of the police after Saddam’s fall
increased pressure on the CPA, and later the Iraqi
government, to speed the development of the
army and transition internal security roles and
114. Author observation while serving with the Coalition
Police Assistance Training Team, 2005–2006.
115. Tony Pfaff, Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police
Forces (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 17–19.
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responsibilities to it. Thus, the CPA was forced to
abandon its original plan to rebuild the Iraqi military
from the ground up—units first, then the ministry—
and instead accelerate establishment of the Ministry of
Defense (MOD), which would suffer from the rush.116
To facilitate reestablishing the military, the CPA
established the Coalition Military Assistance Training
Team to man, train, and equip the Iraqi Army. The
initial intent was to raise nine battalions by 2004 which
would serve as a cadre for expansion.117 Originally,
that expansion was to create a 3-division corps, with
each division containing about 12,000, which could
then grow as needed.118 In an effort to learn lessons
from the past, the Coalition and Military Assistance
Training Team established demographic requirements
for every 1,000 recruits sent to the Kirkush Military
Training Base: 40 percent Arab Shia, 30 percent Arab
Sunni, and 30 percent Kurds, with no specification as
to what percentage of Kurds had to be Shia or Sunni.119
Though the demographic requirements seemed to be
a reasonable effort to build an inclusive military, these
sectarian quotas would later impede unit cohesiveness.
As a result, rebuilding Iraq’s military got off to a
rocky start. In 2005, a RAND study noted a number of
concerns, including the infiltration of army and police
forces by sectarian militias and insurgents, tension
between long-term institution building and short-term
needs associated with fielding the ISF, limited Iraqi
ownership of the institution development process,
116. Andrew Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector:
The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2005), 14, 28–31.
117. Brasier, But Ma’am, 1.
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and a fragmentation of authority.120 When coupled
with low pay and inadequate facilities and training,
many soldiers decided to desert in the early years.121
As one Iraqi told an advisor in 2006 regarding the
motivation of the Iraqi soldiers, “Their country is at
war, their families are in constant danger, and they
are not paid much, they live in Al Anbar, their works
sucks, everyone is corrupt, they don’t get a chance to
see their families often, their relatives and friends are
dying every day, and there is no real incentive to even
be alive.”122
Two years later, The Report of the Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (the Jones
Report) raised similar concerns. The report noted
though the Iraqi Army’s capability was slowly
improving, the army was still hampered by poor
leadership, absenteeism, a lack of discipline, as well as
poor logistics, maintenance, tactical intelligence, and
combined arms capabilities, such as close air and fire
support.123 A US Government Accountability Office
report delivered that same year added disunity and
sectarian influences to that list.124
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DA’ESH ATTACKS
Despite these difficulties, in 2014 the almost
200,000 Iraqi Army soldiers—not to mention the
44,000 Federal Police—should have been able to stop
the 3,000–5,000 Da’esh fighters who participated in
attacks on Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah.125 According
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The
Military Balance 2014, the Iraqi Army was comprised
of 193,400 personnel who comprised 14 divisions,
including 1 armored and 5 mechanized infantry
divisions. These numbers do not include the two
counterterrorism service (CTS) brigades, which fell
under the prime minister’s direct control. They also
do not include the more than 500,000 Ministry of the
Interior (MOI) forces personnel who were also in a
position to confront the Da’esh threat.126
Moreover, these security forces had resisted
al-Qaeda and Da’esh attacks on fixed positions in
125. W. Andrew Terrill, “Understanding the Strength and
Vulnerabilities of ISIS,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014), 16. See
also “Why Iraq’s Army Crumbled; The Forces in Iraq,” Economist
411, no. 8892 (June 21, 2014), https://www.economist.com/middle
-east-and-africa/2014/06/19/why-iraqs-army-crumbled. According to
this report, the number of Da’esh fighters who attacked Mosul
was under 1,000.
126. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military
balance 2014: The annual assessment of global military capabilities
and defence economics (London, UK: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2014), 322–323. The MOI forces consisted
of approximately 531,000 personnel, including 302,000 in the
Iraqi Police Service, 44,000 in the Iraqi Federal Police, 60,000 in
the Department of Border Enforcement, 95,000 in the Facilities
Protection Service, and 30,000 in the Oil Police Service. Of course,
not all of these forces were in a position to directly confront Da’esh
forces. It is also worth keeping in mind that the bulk of the Iraqi
Police Service are deployed in small, local groups that are easily
overmatched by even small concentrations of Da’esh forces.
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the past. Prior to the 2014 offensive, there were
several complex attacks on police stations in western
Iraq involving a combination of suicide vehicles
to breach any defenses followed by assault teams
that attempted to take over these stations.127 Perhaps
more impressively, the security forces successfully
provided security for the largely nonviolent April
30, 2014, parliamentarian elections. This success was
no small feat. The ISF secured 8,000 polling places
where more than 21 million Iraqis voted with levels
of violence much lower than in 2010.128 Thus, in June
2014 it would not have seemed unreasonable to
expect the ISF to effectively battle an outnumbered
and ill-equipped opponent. Instead, the ISF dropped
weapons, equipment, and uniforms and fled.
The causes of the Iraqi Army’s failure begin with
extremely poor civil-military relations and an almost
complete lack of trust in the army where Da’esh
operated. The security situation deteriorated over
extreme feelings of political, economic, and social
marginalization that arose in an isolated Sunni
population that saw few alternatives besides protests,
and later violence, to settle its disputes with a central
government it perceived as being unresponsive or
having inappropriate responses. Demands varied
127. During the author’s time as the defense attaché in
Baghdad from 2012–2013, the Iraqi press reported multiple such
attacks in Fallujah, Rawa, and Anah in western Iraq.
128. Matt Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, “World News: Iraqis
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Nouri al Maliki Seeks Third Term,” Wall Street Journal, May 1,
2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/15082893?accountid=14741.
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 7, 2014, https://www.rferl
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depending on which Sunni leader made them, but
they for the most part included better representation
of Sunnis in state institutions, reintegration of army
officers allegedly dismissed for sectarian reasons, the
end of arrests on unsubstantiated terrorism charges,
and the withdrawal of the government’s security
forces from Sunni-dominated areas.129 It was the Iraqi
government’s sectarian response to these demands
that did more to set the conditions for the increase in
violence than any military failure of the ISF. Though
Sunnis in general were alarmed when Nouri al-Maliki
ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi
almost immediately after the departure of US forces
in 2011, these concerns turned to protest when Maliki
later attempted to arrest Minister of Finance Rafi
al-Issawi, as well as members of his security detail,
on terrorism charges in December 2012. In response,
Sunnis in Ramadi and Fallujah established protest
camps and temporarily blocked the road leading
from Baghdad into Ramadi. Over a few months,
these protests spread beyond Anbar, especially into
Ninevah and Diyala.130 It was this constant message of
marginalization in part that allowed Da’esh to portray
itself as the defender of the Sunni people against a
hostile and foreign government.
Of course, Da’esh attacks against the larger Shia
population prompted it to support the harsh measures
Maliki and the ISF took against the Sunni population.
The continued drumbeat of attacks in Shia-dominated
areas increased popular frustration with the security
129. International Crisis Group, Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian
Bargain, Middle East Report No. 150 (Brussels, Belgium: April 28,
2014), 5.
130. Dexter Filkins, “What We Left Behind,” New Yorker,
April 28, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28
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situation and, consequently, the government. Shia
militants, often dressed in uniforms indistinguishable
from those of the ISF, attempted to fill that vacuum
and began a campaign to drive Sunnis out of some
mixed areas.131 By the end of 2013, many Iraqis were
worried about a return to levels of violence seen in
2007, when sectarian strife had reached its peak.132
In December 2013, Maliki ordered the ISF to break
down protest camps and surround the cities of Ramadi
and Fallujah. At the same time, he ordered the arrest of
Sunni parliamentarian Ahmed al-Alwani on charges
of terrorism. Shortly afterward, Da’esh fighters
poured into those cities, effectively taking control.133
Though these political decisions were instrumental
in giving Islamist terrorists a platform from which
to build support, the ISF—the army, in particular—
often conducted operations in a way that both was
ineffective against terrorist targets and reinforced
Iraqi Sunnis’ perception that the government was
marginalizing them. The reasons for this conduct are
complex.
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International Studies, April 2006), 47–48. During the period of
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Prior to the Iraqi Army and CTS’s rapid retreat
from Sunni-dominated areas, their performance had
been a confusing and inconsistent mix of courage
and cowardice; effective precision raids and large,
ineffective “sweeps”; and significant restraint and
indiscriminate attacks. The CTS, which maintained
constant partnership with US advisors even after the
withdrawal, conducted a number of effective raids
against Da’esh-related targets. But the CTS, which
was not designed to hold ground, would quickly
depart the areas where it conducted operations,
allowing the terrorists to return. Unfortunately, the
Iraqi Army, which should have provided a more
sustained presence, was not up to the task. When it
conducted operations, it would typically mitigate risk
by operating from secure bases and moving in large
formations that often gave Da’esh elements sufficient
warning to evacuate personnel and equipment.134
Foreshadowing the Da’esh takeover of Fallujah,
hundreds of al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters entered the
western towns of Rawa and Anah in late September
2013, attacking the mayor, his house, and other
government facilities and blowing up the bridges
that led into town to prevent reinforcements. One
interlocutor describing the events stated that though
the residents were not happy about the Islamist
presence, few were upset by the raid since al-Qaeda in
Iraq attacked only government officials and facilities
that were not popular in the province. The interlocutor
quoted one resident as saying that unlike the ISF, the
al-Qaeda in Iraq forces conducting the raid did not
harass the population, but focused on government
of Iraq officials and facilities. As if to underscore that
point, the next day the ISF reportedly arrested more
134. Rayburn and Sobchak, The US Army, 591.
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than 300 Sunnis, though all were reportedly later
released by Iraqi judges due to insufficient evidence.135
As the summer went on, Da’esh increased its presence
in Iraqi towns and along Iraqi highways, where the
ISF had previously been able to move unchallenged.
Back in Anbar, especially Fallujah, the tribes found
themselves in an uncomfortable position. Local police
had abandoned their posts, and many fled or were
otherwise keeping a low profile.136 Desperate to keep
the ISF from entering the city—for fear of a repeat of
the events at Hawija—these local tribal leaders found
themselves relying on Da’esh for protection while
at the same time trying to broker its departure. This
desperation increased as ISF artillery pounded the city,
forcing thousands to flee. As an International Crisis
Group report noted, Fallujah found itself in a “vicious
circle.” The more the army shelled the town, the more
the town needed Da’esh to defend it. The more Da’esh
defended it, however, the more likely the army was to
increase military force, often indiscriminately.137
After the fall of Fallujah to Da’esh in January 2014,
the Iraqi Army further mitigated risk by employing
indirect fire, even in crowded urban areas,138 rather
than assaulting and seizing the territory. These
tactics, which were reminiscent of the overwhelmingfirepower approach the Iraqi Army used against the
135. Sunni tribal leader, interview by the author, September
26, 2013.
136. International Crisis Group, Iraq, 1.
137. International Crisis Group, Iraq, 15.
138. Loveday Morris, “Iraqi Army Faces Death, Desertions
as It Struggles with Anbar Offensive,” Washington Post, May
10,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east
/iraqi-army-faces-death-and-desertions-as-it-struggles-with-anbar
-offensive/2014/05/08/83720f79-6cd2-4c7c-883b-dfe181ce7a5b_story
.html. Multiple press reports have described ISF use of artillery in
urban areas. See also International Crisis Group, Iraq, 7.
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Kurds in the 1960s, further alienated the population
and largely failed to disrupt insurgent operations.
Meanwhile, despite an additional 42,000 personnel
being deployed to Anbar by May 2014, the Iraqi Army
was frequently outgunned and outmaneuvered. As a
result, its operations became bogged down, forcing it
to rely more on standoff weapons, such as artillery and
air-attack, including, reportedly “barrel bombing,”
which entailed dropping large, air-fueled, explosive
containers indiscriminately in neighborhoods were
Da’esh had a foothold.139 During these operations, the
Iraqi Army suffered mass desertions, especially from
those units that were transferred into the area from
more peaceful parts of Iraq.
This dynamic placed the ISF in another vicious circle
where risk aversion stemming from poor conditions
drove indiscriminate practices that alienated the
population and empowered its adversaries, which, in
turn, encouraged greater risk aversion because there
was little incentive to take risks on behalf of leaders
responsible for these conditions and little reason for
Iraqi soldiers to take risks on behalf of a population
that resented them. If the hallmark of professionalism
is trust, the Iraqi Army of 2014 did not have it: the
people did not trust it and its members did not trust
each other.
IRAQ FIGHTS BACK
Just as it did when Iranian forces threatened Iraq’s
territorial integrity, the Iraqi Army rallied to fight back.
139. Mark Lattimer, Miriam Puttick, and Mays Al-Jaboori,
Civilian protection in the battle for Mosul: Critical priorities (London,
UK: Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights
Group International, October 2016), 4. See also Morris, “Iraqi
Army Faces Death.”
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The difference this time was, rather than relatively
covert and limited support from benefactors such as
the United States, Great Britain, and France, the Iraqi
Army had the robust backing of a United States-led
coalition, which included several of the gulf Arab
states. This coalition provided advisors; weapons;
equipment; as well as intelligence, indirect fire, and
close air support. The other difference this time was
the creation of the Shia PMF, which rapidly mobilized
more than 100,000 Iraqi citizens and brought Iraq’s
militias, especially those backed by Iran, into the fight
on the side of the government. For the first time in
Iraq’s history, almost all of its neighbors as well as
international partners were fighting with it.140
The counteroffensive got off to a rough start when,
in June 2014, an assault on Tikrit stalled.141 By August,
however, the ISF had its first significant success. With
the help of US airstrikes against Da’esh vehicles and
supply routes, a combined force of Iraqi Army, Kurdish
peshmerga, and Shia militias lifted the Da’esh siege
of Amerli, effectively stopping Da’esh’s southward
advance.142 This would establish a successful pattern of
US-Iraqi military cooperation where the more precise
coalition strikes would enable the Iraqi Army and CTS
to assault Da’esh positions while the PMF and other
units would secure the area and prevent Da’esh retreat
or counterattack.
140. Amnesty International, Iraq, 4.
141. Heather L. Pickerell and Ahmed Ali, Iraq Situation Report
June 28, 2014 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War,
June 2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014
-06-28%20Situation%20Report_6.pdf.
142. Ahmed Ali and Lauren Squires, Iraq Situation Report:
August 29-31, 2014 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of
War, August 2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default
/files/2014-08-29-31%20Situation%20Report.pdf.
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The ISF, including the PMF, renewed its efforts to
take Tikrit in March 2015 when it initiated an offensive
that would fully liberate the city by early April.143 The
offensive began as an uncoordinated attack on the part
of the Iran-backed PMF—reportedly ordered by Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander
Qasem Soleimani—which quickly got bogged down.144
The Iraqi government reinforced the PMF with the CTS
and the Iraqi Army as well as requested US close air
support, which the United States provided contingent
on the removal of the PMF,145 which had already
developed a reputation for brutality among Sunni
populations.146 Though the move caused some friction
between the Baghdad- and Iran-backed militias, Tikrit
was liberated.147
As the fight went on, other patterns were
established. First was the prime role of the CTS
in almost every major engagement as well as the
contrasting limited role of the Iraqi Army and PMF.
During the liberation of Fallujah, for example, the
Iraqi Army 10th Division ended up doing not much
more than providing logistics to the CTS, despite
being ordered to play a major role in the operation.
143. Sinan Adnan, Iraq Situation Report: February 28–March
3, 2015 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, March
2015), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20
SITREP%202015-2-28-3-1_V5.pdf.
144. Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin,
Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Order of Battle
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, December 2017),
31.
145. Dan De Luce and Henry Johnson, “Can the U.S. Control
Iran’s Militias in the Fight for Fallujah,” Foreign Policy, June 9,
2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/09/can-the-u-s-control-irans
-militias-in-the-fight-for-fallujah-shiite-iraq-isis/.
146. Amnesty International, Iraq, 4.
147. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 31.
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Moreover, the PMF performed equally dismally,
having failed in almost every operation in which it
was involved.148 Even Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi
reportedly remarked on the PMF’s insubordination,
noting that despite it being ordered to recapture areas
surrounding Tal Afar to cut Da’esh supply lines to
Syria, it had not even tried.149
The situation for the Iraqi Army, however, had
improved by the Mosul campaign. The army had
displayed a degree of endurance and adaptability
reminiscent of the days when it drove Iranian forces
from Iraqi soil. It had also made improvements
to equipment—such as mounting Kornet missile
launchers onto United States-provided high mobility,
multipurpose wheeled vehicles—and collected
actionable intelligence. As Middle East expert Norman
Ricklefs observed, “This represents considerable
progress from the static, defensive ‘checkpoint force’
that characterized much of the regular army at time
of the IS blitzkrieg.”150 As a result, the 9th Armored
Division, which advanced up the eastern bank of the
Tigris, and the 15th Infantry Division, which advanced
up the western bank, made a more substantial
contribution to Mosul’s liberation than the Iraqi Army
10th Division did in Tikrit.151
Moreover, the CTS, at least, had developed a good
relationship with civilians in Mosul. In conducting
operations, it limited collateral harm and even took
148. Norm Ricklefs, “The Iraqi Military, the US-Led Coalition
and the Mosul Operation: The Risk of Snatching Defeat from the
Jaws of Victory,” Small Wars Journal, December 22, 2016, http://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-iraqi-military-the-us-led-coalition
-and-the-mosul-operation-the-risk-of-snatching-defea.
149. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 31.
150. Ricklefs, “The Iraqi Military.”
151. IHS Markit, Iraq, 88–89.
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extra measures to protect civilians.152 As Ricklefs
noted, one good news story that emerged from
Mosul was the “well documented positive reception
CTS has had in cleared neighborhoods, with many
residents expressing the wish that Iraqi forces will
stay on.”153 Amnesty International noted that civilians
praised the ISF in general, and the CTS in particular,
because they attempted to spare them from violence
during the heat of battle and showed “kindness and
respect” to civilians in areas they had recently taken
from Da’esh.154 In fact, a February 2017 survey by the
National Democratic Institute observed that the Iraqi
Army (which included the CTS) had emerged as a
potent symbol of cross-sectarian pride.155
These CTS operations, which prioritized the
protection of civilians, came at a high cost. In east
Mosul, air strikes tended to be against preselected
targets as opposed to calls from troops in contact.
Moreover, the CTS was expected to fight without
air support in the densely populated neighborhoods
that Da’esh held and where they forced civilians to
remain to use them as human shields. As an Amnesty
International study observed, “The CTS paid a heavy
price for this tactic; estimates of CTS casualties,
including deaths and injuries, in east Mosul range
from 4,000 to 6,000 of a total fighting force of 8,000
152. Amnesty International, At Any Cost: The Civilian
Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq (London, UK: Amnesty
International, 2017), 25–26.
153. Ricklefs, “The Iraqi Military.”
154. Amnesty International, At Any Cost, 26.
155. National Democratic Institute, A Fragile Unity: After
Military Gains, Iraqis Look to Leaders for a Better Future, February 2017,
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Iraq_FocusGroupPublication
_FullReport2.pdf.
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troops, meaning the CTS was depleted by between
50% and 75%.”156
As a result, while the CTS still fought in west
Mosul, it was joined in greater force by the MOI’s
Federal Police and Emergency Response Divisions as
well as elements of the Iraqi Army. These forces were
not as well-trained as the CTS and were arguably more
risk-averse. Moreover, as an Amnesty International
report notes, the fighting was harder since the PMF
had effectively cut off Da’esh escape routes, forcing
its fighters to take a stronger stand than they had in
east Mosul. As a result, this operation saw a greater
reliance on less-precise weapons, such as artillery,
mortars, and improvised rocket assisted munitions,
which caused greater civilian casualties and damage to
infrastructure.157 Arguably, in some cases, the battle for
west Mosul probably looked more like the operations
the Iraqi Army had conducted in its 1974–1975
confrontation with the Kurds, where any resistance
was met, as discussed previously, by overwhelming
firepower.
By the end of the conflict, the Iraqi Army had
performed substantially better than it had in the past
and had achieved a number of victories. The Iraqi
Army, in general, performed substantially better than
it had in the past, and has a number of victories it can
claim. The army, in conjunction with Federal Police
and Sunni tribal groups, successfully defended the
dam, power, and refining facilities in Haditha as well
as at Dhuluiya, where they held out six months before
they were relieved. Moreover, beginning in 2015, the
Iraqi Army successfully led a number of offensives
156. Amnesty International, At Any Cost, 11.
157. Amnesty International, At Any Cost, 11–13.
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that finally wrested control of Iraqi territory from
Da’esh.158
With the end of Da’esh control over Iraqi territory,
the Iraqi Army finds itself in a unique moment in
its history. In addition to being successful against a
determined foe, it fought in a way that strengthened its
legitimacy among multiple Iraqi sects.159 But if the past
is any indication, the Iraqi Army will not likely sustain
this momentum without continuous engagement
by the United States and like-minded allies. As
Cordesman observes of the ISF in general following
the US withdrawal in 2011, “The ISF often found it
easier to revert to the past than accept US military
models, particularly when Iraq’s political leadership
insisted on repeating Saddam Hussein’s efforts to
micromanage every aspect of security operations,
enforce political control, bypass the formal chain of
command, and limit initiative at every level.”160
The ISF’s initial poor performance was largely
due to long-standing issues including overlapping
chains of command; poor administration; sectarian
influences; and limited logistic, command and control,
and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, corrupt legacy
practices made it difficult to reform because they
diverted resources away from the fight and created
158. Michael Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces
(Baghdad, Iraq: Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, March
2016), 26.
159. National Democratic Institute, A Fragile Unity. See also
Munqith Dagher, “Iraqi Public Opinion Shows a New Bridge of
Hope and a New Valley of Concerns,” The Washington Institute,
June 7, 2017, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view
/iraqi-public-opinion-shows-a-new-bridge-of-hope-and-an-old-valley
-of-concer.
160. Anthony Cordesman, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 12, 2014), 19.
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poor conditions for soldiers and police as funds for
food, housing, fuel, and maintenance were drained.
These practices limited the resources available to Iraqi
forces and undermined the kind of trust necessary for
reform. As a result, absent positive external influences,
the Iraqi Army will likely revert to the disunified,
ineffective, corrupt, and risk-averse organization it
has been for much of its history.
Table 1. Iraqi Army Historical Strengths
and Weaknesses
ERA

STRENGTHS

WEAKNESSES

NOTES

PREISLAMIC
(Pre 7thCentury)

Courage; stealth;
cleverness; agility

Large operations;
defense against
better-organized
opponents

Raid culture;
blood feuds cause
for most violence

ISLAMIC
(Ottoman)
(late 18thearly 20th
Centuries)

Modern, wellequipped; largescale operations

Personnel;
leadership

Divided loyalties,
nationalism
lowered morale;
recruited soldiers
from lower,
uneducated
classes

MANDATE
(1921-1933)

Internal stability
operations

Counter
insurgency operations

Successful
against
small groups
(Assyrians,
tribes); British
support enabled
limited success
against Kurds;
Nationalizing
force in tension
with sectarian
loyalties caused
identity crisis

ISRAEL
WARS
(1948, 1973)

Modern, wellequipped;
logistics; cohesion

Combined arms
operations;
maneuver;
intelligence;
tactics; initiative

Modernized
with Russian
equipment;
poorest tactical
performer among
Arab armies
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Table 1 (continued)
ERA

STRENGTHS

WEAKNESSES

FIGHTING
KURDS
(1961-1970;
1974-1975)

Improved
logistics;
improved
strategic choices

Tactics; initiative

Success result of
isolating Kurds
and choice of
Kurds to fight
Iraqi Army
conventionally;
overwhelming
firepower

IRAN-IRAQ
WAR
(1980-1988)

Defense; combat
engineering;
small, limited,
well-rehearsed
operations;
logistics; cohesion

Combined arms
operations;
maneuver;
intelligence;
maintenance;
politicization

Poor offensive
operations in
Iran due to
overwhelmingfirepower tactics;
in Iraq, increased
cohesion and
merit promotions

GULF WAR
(1991)

Small, limited,
well-rehearsed
operations

Combined arms
operations;
maneuver;
intelligence;
communications;
cohesion;
politicization

Poor strategic
assumptions
regarding
coalition plans
and resilience

US
INVASION
(2003)

Guerrilla
operations

Combined arms
operations;
maneuver;
intelligence;
cohesion;
communications;
politicization

Poor
conventional
defense;
ex-military
contributed
to success
of multiple
insurgent groups

AL-QAEDA
IN IRAQ/
DA’ESH
(2011-2014)

Fixed-site defense

Morale;
intelligence;
tactics; initiative;
logistics and
maintenance;
cohesion;
politicization

Low morale
due to corrupt
practices,
hostility of
population

DA’ESH
(2014-2018)

Air-ground integration; improved
intelligence;
improved counterinsurgency
operations;
cohesion

Local security
operations;
logistics and
maintenance

Uncoordinated
operations,
especially
where PMF
was involved;
poor ability
to establish
security for local
populations
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NOTES

THE FUTURE IRAQI ARMY
If the Iraqi Army’s history is an indicator of future
performance, at its best the Iraqi Army is characterized
by courageous soldiers fighting in cohesive units led
by tactically incompetent and often highly politicized
officers who have competing loyalties arising from
multiple, competing patronage networks. It should
be no surprise, then, that the Iraqi Army has had
difficulty developing a way of war that works. The
raw materials are there, but the ability to generate and
disseminate expert knowledge over any jurisdiction
associated with landpower simply does not yet exist.
This historically optimized Iraqi Army should be
able to handle significant logistics and engineering
challenges as long as corruption and competition from
other services do not prevent it from doing so. But it is
challenged to provide other kinds of combat support,
such as communications and intelligence. Senior
Iraqi leadership can, in times of crisis, improvise with
the limited resources they have to achieve limited
strategic military objectives; however, their tendency
toward politicization—driven by the army’s historic
association with coups—undermines their ability to
hold on to the improvements they have made.
Unlike in the 1930s, when Arab and Kurdish
Iraqis rallied around the army’s victory against the
lightly armed Assyrians, a majority of Iraqis, many
from different sects and ethnicities, have placed a
newfound faith in the Iraqi Army after its role in the
victory against a well-organized, well-equipped, and
determined enemy that was a threat to all Iraqis.
Where the former victory established the Iraqi Army as
an enforcer, the latter has established it as a liberator.
Of course, that identity is currently at risk given the
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army’s role in suppressing anti-government and antiIran protests; however, it is too soon to see how Iraqi
public perception will evolve.161
So, to the extent it can also establish itself as
inclusive, it can play a positive role in bridging Iraq’s
sectarian divides. Moreover, this inclusivity does not
have to express itself in terms of demographic balance,
which tends to undermine trust in individual units, as
the Coalition and Military Assistance Training Team
experienced. Rather, the army’s ability to coordinate
its operations in Anbar with those of the Sunni tribal
militia and Shia-dominated Federal Police suggests
it can play an accepted, neutral role in establishing
security throughout Iraq.
There will, of course, be plenty of opportunities
to play a positive role in the foreseeable future.
As the glow of liberation fades, the Iraqi Army, in
conjunction with the other security services, will need
to focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
and consolidation operations as it works with Iraqi
law enforcement organizations to set conditions for
local security. To conduct those missions effectively,
the Iraqi Army will have to address the enduring
weaknesses and vulnerabilities to which their history
has given rise. Fortunately, that history also indicates
which critical areas the Iraqi Army, along with its
partners, should emphasize.
These weaknesses and vulnerabilities are critical not
only because they reoccur throughout Iraq’s military
history. In addition, they overlap to the degree that
improvements in one are necessary for improvements
161. Richard Gonzales, “Iraqi Security Forces Killed 149 People
in Recent Protests, Inquiry Concludes,” National Public Radio,
October 22, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/22/772443972/iraqi
-security-forces-killed-149-people-in-recent-protests-inquiry-concludes.
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in the other and, moreover, failure to improve at least
somewhat in all will likely undermine any benefit
from improving in just one. In this way, disunity
creates space for corruption, which in turn inhibits the
Iraqi Army’s ability to establish the communications,
logistics, and intelligence infrastructure necessary for
a modern army and undermines the administrative
accountability necessary to effectively recruit,
train, and equip soldiers. The result is a high rate of
absenteeism as well as risk aversion among those
soldiers who remain. In this next section, I will discuss
each of these critical areas for engagement in more
detail.
UNITY OF COMMAND
One of the enduring problems associated with
the ISF in general is a lack of unity. Given the
authoritarian nature of Iraqi governance, this concern
might seem counterintuitive. It arises, however,
out of a combination of culture and politics. As De
Atkine observes, Arab armies in general are plagued
by a “lack of cooperation” resulting from cultural
difficulties with extending trust outside close circles
typically identified by family, tribe, and sect.162 This
cultural norm is amplified, especially in totalitarian
states, by a general distrust of the military which
arises from its historic role in coups. As noted above,
this distrust drives the creation of competing military
and intelligence organizations that further undermine
unity of command.
162. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” 7. De Atkine notes
that elite units, which have the mission to protect the regime,
rather than the country, are an exception to this pattern.
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In the Iraqi context, this disunity is as much a
function of the army’s historic mission of being a
balance to the government and other armed forces
as it is a function of the current, competitive political
situation. To underscore the enduring nature of this
problem, it is worth pointing out that Iraqi leaders
since Saddam have tried to create alternate chains
of command within the armed forces. For example,
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki created the Office
of Commander in Chief in 2006, which reported
directly to him and included the CTS, to which he
added the Iraqi Special Operations brigades. The
Office of Commander in Chief also controlled the
56th Brigade (the “Baghdad Brigade”) and the 57th
Brigade, which he assigned in 2013 to guard the Green
Zone’s outer ring. The office exerted influence through
Baghdad Operations Command, which in turn was
able to influence the other provincial operations
commands. Though its control over the provincial
operational commands was less direct, it still served
as a node through which Maliki could control security
operations throughout the country outside the view
of the National Operations Center. Though Prime
Minister Abadi dissolved the office shortly after he
took power, some of those relationships still endure,
such as the CTS reporting directly to the prime
minister.163
Achieving unity can be further complicated
by the top-heavy nature of the Iraqi Army. In the
battle for Ramadi, for example, 5 3-star or 2-star
generals controlled areas of operations with as few
as 2,000 troops. Over those five, there were two main
headquarters: the Combined Joint Operations Centre,
which compensated for the partial collapse of Anbar
163. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 10.
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Operations Command, and Baghdad Operations
Command. The result of this was conflicting orders,
gaps in troop coverage, and eventual, if temporary,
defeat.164
Exacerbating this concern is, of course, the PMF,
which the passage of the popular mobilization law
in 2016 established as an independent part of the ISF
and provided with $1.5 billion from the Iraqi budget.165
Like the CTS, these forces also report directly to the
prime minister; however, their precise role has not
yet been established.166 Though the PMF could play a
complementary role to the Iraqi Army, its leadership
has expressed the intent to transform the organization
into an Iraqi equivalent of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, which itself competes with the regular
Iranian armed forces for jurisdiction and resources, to
the latter’s detriment.167 There is no reason to believe
the same will not happen in Iraq.
Moreover, having a force under the prime minister
as large as the PMF—perhaps as much as 141,000
personnel168—facilitates alternate chains of command
that make effective coordination of security operations
difficult, if not impossible. The PMF’s attack on Tikrit
suggests the organization did not coordinate the
attack with the other Iraqi services and launched the
attack on the orders of Iran. Furthermore, as Abadi’s
complaint suggests, this incident was not isolated,
but rather one more example of divided loyalties. It is
worth pointing out both the deputy chairman of the
PMF and the commander of Kata’ib Hezbollah, Abu
Mahdi al-Muhandis, as well as Badr Corps Secretary
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 41–42.
Amnesty International, Iraq, 9.
Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 28.
Amnesty International, Iraq, 11.
Amnesty International, Iraq, 9.
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General Hadi al-Amiri have also acknowledged the
PMF’s dependence for guidance and resources on Iran
rather than the government of Iraq.169 Perhaps even
more important is the role these militias are currently
playing in violently attacking protestors on the order
and direction of Iran.170 Thus, a permanent PMF
organized along the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps model will, in addition to creating competition
with the other services, serve as another avenue of
Iranian influence that will further undermine the unity
of Iraq’s armed forces.171
CORRUPTION
The greatest weakness of the Iraqi Army is its
tendency toward corrupt activities that undermine its
readiness and capabilities. Though no military is free
from corruption at some level—consider the recent
“Fat Leonard” scandal the US Navy experienced—
the nature and scale of corruption in the Iraqi Army
renders many of its units ineffective. This corruption
takes a number of forms, the most malicious of which
is the purchasing of command and other senior
positions. One anonymous Iraqi officer explained the
following in 2014 after Da’esh seized Mosul.
169. Dury-Agri et al., Iraqi Security Forces, 32.
170. Ali Mamouri, “Chaos spreads in Iraq as PM office
remains vacant,” Al-Monitor, December 6, 2019, https://www
.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/12/iraq-protests-najaf-prime
-minister.html#ixzz67MpDZwnu; and Renad Mansour, Thanassis
Cambanis, and Michael Wahid Hanna, “These Iraqi militias
are attacking protestors and getting away with it. Here’s why,”
Washington Post, November 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/2019/11/18/these-iraqi-militias-are-attacking-protesters
-getting-away-with-it-heres-why/.
171. Amnesty International, Iraq, 27. See also Dury-Agri et al.,
Iraqi Security Forces, 28.
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Okay. I will explain the corruption to you. If I am the
battalion commander—they are selling the positions of
leadership in the Iraqi Army. I pay you $50,000 US and
I can be a battalion commander right now. If I get this
command position, I can control more than $100 [sic]
Million dinar each month and get a very good benefit—
it’s a business—not an Army. Going down from the
battalion commander—the S2 can blackmail officers in
the unit as well. If I don’t pay the S2 he can report people
to the intelligence in Baghdad. The battalion commander
will pay the S2 to make him shut his mouth. You will see
the intelligence guy with the battalion commander—they
are the best of friends. Because the BC gives money to the
S2 so both of them get benefited, so the unit’s screwed up,
so the IA is screwed up, so ISIS will win.172

These positions can come at a high price, but as the
above testimony suggests, the price is worth it. There
are reports a brigade command can be bought for as
high as USD $500,000 and a division command can
go for as much as $2 million.173 Though US advisors
observed this practice prior to the departure of
US forces in 2011,174 its effects were more apparent
after US forces left. As a 2013 Center for Strategic
and International Studies report noted, “[m]ilitary
leadership positions are opportunities for senior
personnel to solidify power bases and dispense
patronage in the form of military supplies, including
ammunition, food, water, and vehicle repair parts.
As a result senior commanders hoard supplies in
order to maintain their power and influence, and
172. Chris Mercado, “Voices from the Front: An Iraqi Army
Officer’s Account of the Battle Against the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS),” Foreign Intrigue, September 1, 2014.
173. Peter Van Buren, “You Too Can Command an Iraqi
Division for Only $2 Million,” Reuters, December 10, 2014,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/10/you-too-can-com
-mand-an-iraqi-army-division-for-only-2-million/.
174. Cordesman, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces, 10.
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military sustainment is held hostage to bureaucratic
infighting.”175
By using their operating budget and supplies to
build patronage and power bases—thus justifying their
large investment to obtain the position—commanders
ultimately have to cut back on expenditures for food,
housing, spare parts, and fuel. The result is a force that
is poorly housed, poorly fed, and poorly equipped.
As one Iraqi soldier put it, “we have no pay, no new
clothes, no new uniforms, no food, we get shot at
every day. How can we continue this way of life?”176
It should not be surprising, then, that units where
these practices are limited or nonexistent, like the
CTS, perform better than those where they are more
widespread, even when both units have received
similar support from the United States and its allies.
Corruption of this sort is, of course, endemic and
pervasive in Iraqi society and certainly not exclusive
to the security ministries. As noted earlier, the
dominance of external patronage relationships—like
family, tribe, and sect—always ensured complex and
competing loyalties for the individual Iraqi and a level
of patronage within the armed forces that undermined
meritocracy. Saddam, of course, managed those
networks to ensure this patronage worked toward his
goals, often at the expense of Iraqi Army capability.
But UN sanctions imposed in the aftermath of
the 1991 Gulf War reduced the resources available
across the Iraqi economy and stimulated the growth
of a shadow economy that relied more on family,
clan, tribal, and other ties to generate the kind of trust
needed to make an economy work. More specifically,
in the austere years of the 1990s, the central
175. Cordesman, Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces, 11.
176. Gray, Embedded, 86.
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government in Baghdad was forced to outsource
the funding of many of its security and economic
functions because it lacked the resources to do it itself.
In order to preserve control, the Baath Party began to
function as more of an umbrella organization for tribes
that then served these functions. According to Robert
Looney, “[b]y 1996, officially sanctioned ‘tribes’ were
not only responsible for the maintenance of local law
and order, but also collected taxes on behalf of the
government, were appointed judicial powers, and
applied customary tribal law within their territory.”177
The effect was to strengthen tribal hold on the
distribution of goods, services, and, perhaps more
importantly, jobs. As Phil Williams states, “In sum,
Iraq under Saddam Hussein resembled an extended
mafia family with Saddam as the ‘godfather,’
presiding over extensive criminal entrepreneurship,
some under the direction of the regime, some under
the tacit blessing of the regime, and some clearly
outside its purview and control.”178 When Saddam fell,
these networks became available for co-option by a
host of new actors who struggled for control of Iraq’s
government, including Shia militias, Sunni insurgents,
and transnational jihadists who made it “sometimes
impossible to differentiate political or military agendas
from the purely criminal pursuit of profit.”179
Perhaps more importantly for the security
ministries, the political parties, most of which had
an association with Shia militias, employed similar
methods to expand their networks in the ministries. As
177. Robert E. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding
Under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption
in Iraq, International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (June 2008), 435.
178. Phil Williams, “Organized Crime and Corruption in
Iraq,” International Peacekeeping 16, no.1 (February 2009), 118.
179. Williams, “Organized Crime and Corruption,” 118.
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discussed before, under Saddam loyalty was probably
the most important qualifier for senior positions in
the Iraqi government. After Saddam, the importance
of that qualifier did not change; however, the number
of persons or institutions to which one could or
should owe loyalty proliferated to the extent that it
undermined the possibility of trust at every level.
As Looney further observed, “In short, government
ministries are being staffed with party cronies and
their budgets are being used as sources of power
for political parties.”180 Moreover, as Major David
Voorhies, an advisor to the Iraqi Army in 2006, noted,
“Tribal loyalties; religious alliances; and the aspects
of prestige, influence, power, money, and revenge
played heavily on the motives of those I advised.”181
There is no reason to think those competing loyalties
and motives are not still present in the Iraqi Army
today.
As a result, there is little of the trust in the Iraqi
Army necessary for it to truly professionalize. This
point is not to say that trust is entirely absent. What
is missing is the kind of trust large organizations need
to function. As Looney states, there are generally three
kinds of trust relationships: ascribed, process-based,
and extended. In the first, trust is based on identity. To
the extent one is a member of a particular family, tribe,
or ethnic group, one is trusted. There is plenty of this
kind of trust in the Iraqi government, especially where
parties and sects have consolidated power. In the
second, trust is based on personal knowledge about
another person, but independent of that person’s
180. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding,” 428.
181. Major David Voorhies, “Making MITT Work: Insights
into Advising the Iraqi Army,” Infantry 96, no. 3 (May/June 2007),
31.
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identity. In the Iraqi context, it is difficult for this kind
of trust to supersede the first kind. As a result, units
that are relatively integrated are likely to have a harder
time establishing trust internally, though externally
they may serve as a model for others. In the third,
persons are willing to enter into trust relationships
based on limited information about specific attributes
of another person. These kinds of relationships are
essential for the efficient functioning of, for example,
large economies where persons who are relatively
anonymous are nevertheless willing to extend the
kind of trust necessary to make loans, buy on credit,
and wait for goods and services to be delivered after
payment is given.182 That kind of trust does not exist
on any meaningful scale anywhere in Iraq.
This last kind of relationship is, however, essential
to the running of any large, diverse, professional
organization in which members need to trust
individuals with whom the only thing they have in
common is their professional identity. Trust has a
strong correlation with loyalty and as long as the
individual’s loyalty is divided, the organization will
suffer. This is not to say that one cannot be loyal to
more than one person or organization in more than
one context. It is just that loyalty has to be ordered
so the organization is not divided. One can certainly
be a loyal US soldier while still being a loyal spouse,
parent, child, or church member. The issue arises
when one is forced to choose. In the Iraqi context,
such choices often entail employing or promoting a
relative over the more competent other. Doing so may
promote trust on the small scale, but it discourages it
on the larger scale. The task, then, for the Iraqi Army is
182. Looney, “Reconstruction and Peacebuilding,” 431.
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to institutionalize ways to prevent such choices from
arising.
POOR COMBAT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES:
COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND
INTELLIGENCE
It can be said of most Middle Eastern militaries that
their communications, logistics, and intelligence—
especially technical—capabilities are typically their
least developed.183 There are, of course, a number of
reasons for this situation, and I will not go into all of
them here. But in working security cooperation with
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, the most frequent
request from military and defense leaders is assistance
in developing these three areas. In this regard,
the Iraqi military shares the same organizational
shortcomings, except the current conditions under
which they operate place these already weak systems
under considerable stress.184
Communications
In addition to the lack of unity described above,
the Iraqi Army also suffers from poor communications
infrastructure and practices. It is important to note,
however, that things are not as bad as they were in
2007, when the Government Accountability Office
reported the ISF had to rely on the United States
for much of its communications architecture. As
Marisa Sullivan noted, the Iraqis had improved their
capabilities even prior to 2014, to the extent that
the operations commands were “quite successful
at planning and executing security operations,
183. Pollack, Arabs at War, 6–11.
184. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 53.
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coordinating the efforts of military and police forces in
a given area, [and] improving communication across
the chain of command.”185 But even in the battle for
Mosul, which likely represented a high point of Iraqi
Army capability, coalition advisors reported that the
ISF had some difficulty because of problems with
“sporadic” partner position location information,
making it difficult to get a common operating picture
during this battle.186
Some of the difficulties may be due to cultural
factors. As De Atkine also observes, “Arabs husband
information and hold it especially tightly,” adding
that Arab soldiers understand their value to the
organization in terms of the unique skills and
knowledge they possess. Transmitting those skills and
knowledge to others undermines the soldiers’ personal
value.187 It is important, however, not to overstate
this dynamic. Though it accounts for an observed
reluctance by members of different organizations
within the security services to share expertise and
specialized knowledge, it does not follow that there
is a lack of willingness to give and take orders from
higher levels of command. In fact, as Pollack noted,
the greater problem for the Iraqi Army has been an
unwillingness to do anything absent such orders, as
when the Iraqi Army failed to pursue weaker Israeli
forces in 1973.188 This point suggests what is lacking
185. Marisa Sullivan, Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, April 2013), http://
www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian
-Regime-Web.pdf.
186. Mosul Study Group, What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the
Force (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 11.
187. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” 3.
188. Author observation. On more than one occasion, the
author was asked by one element of the ISF to obtain information,
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is the kind of lateral communication necessary for
better situational awareness and combined arms
operations.189
A larger contributor to communications problems
is poor infrastructure. The civilian backbone through
which the operations centers communicate with
subordinate units as well as the National Operations
Center suffer frequent power outages as well as theft
of equipment.190 Moreover, this system is not very
secure. A lot of operational information is provided
over email, which also uses the civilian infrastructure.
Fortunately, Da’esh does not appear to have sufficient
capability to fully exploit such vulnerabilities,
so it does not seem that secure communications
issues significantly impair ISF operations, though
this vulnerability would significantly impact ISF
operations against a more capable foe.
Logistics and Maintenance
The 2007 Jones Report described logistics as the
“Achilles heel of the Iraqi ground forces.”191 As one
senior Iraqi officer stated, Iraqi commanders “lack
basic knowledge of military logistics,” which leaves
“many enlistees to scrounge for themselves or go
hungry.”192 Food is not the only commodity Iraqis have
such as maps, from other elements.
189. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” 5.
190. IHS Markit, Iraq, 58–59.
191. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 69.
192. Matthew Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi
Military is Outmatched on Battlefield,” Wall Street Journal,
updated May 1, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fledgling-iraqi
-military-is-outmatched-on-battlefield-1398652250. See also “Alas, It
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difficulty supplying.193 The same system that moves
food also moves fuel and spare parts. As a result,
though supplies at Iraqi bases are often adequate,
the Iraqis have extreme difficulties supplying troops
on the move. This deficiency forces the army to
operate from large bases, which significantly reduces
their range of operations. Additionally, the corrupt
practices of officers husbanding unit resources for
their own personal aggrandizement further limit what
is available for the fight. Thus, when it does move,
the Iraqi Army often finds itself outgunned and with
limited ammunition compared to Da’esh fighters.194
Widespread corruption and the competing
desire to eliminate it result in a cumbersome, highly
centralized bureaucracy that makes supplying and
maintaining the force prohibitively difficult. These
difficulties arise because this centralization relieves
the individual soldiers and junior officers of the
responsibility to ensure equipment works and soldiers
have sufficient food, fuel, and ammunition to operate.
As Michael Knights observed in 2016, “it can take the
signatures of three three-star generals and the minister
of defence [sic] to release a shipment of Humvee tires
from Taji to a military unit.”195
As a result, spare parts and ammunition remain
on shelves, forcing soldiers to cannibalize captured
weapons and sometimes their own systems to remain
in the fight. It is no wonder that Iraq’s M1A1 fleet
is at 40-percent readiness. It is also no wonder that
rather than repairing them, it was easier for the Iraqis,
whatever their actual reasons were, to buy T-90s from
193. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”
194. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”
195. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 50.
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Russia to make up for this shortfall.196 In fact, from the
Iraqi perspective, there is a strategic utility in having
multiple security partners, especially those with UN
Security Council veto power. Though Russia may not
be a preferred partner from the United States’ point of
view, from the Iraqi point of view, having Russia as
a potential supplier diversifies sources of equipment
and expertise and makes the Iraqi government less
vulnerable to external political pressure.
Intelligence
Iraqi Security Force (ISF) intelligence operations,
including those of the Iraqi Army, improved after
2014. The ISF improved both its ability to act on
intelligence quickly, as in an Iraqi helicopter attack
on a Da’esh convoy in Fallujah, and its collection and
dissemination of real-time intelligence from civilians
during the battle for Mosul.197 But enduring problems
remain, and the chances of backsliding are high. As the
Jones Report noted in 2007, “information sharing and
cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community
and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a
problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition
and distrust among duplicative intelligence
organizations.”198 Though anecdotally things arguably
improved during the Da’esh fight, the army’s—as
well as Federal Police’s—reliance on less discriminate
196. “Iraq Receives First Batch of Russian T-90 Battle
Tanks,” Middle East Monitor, February 16, 2018, https://
www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180216-iraq-receives-first
-batch-of-russian-t-90-battle-tanks/.
197. Christian Triebert, “An Open Source Analysis
of the Fallujah ‘Convoy Massacre’(s),” Bellingcat, July
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2016,
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weapons suggests an inability to locate and maneuver
against enemy positions without first making contact.
Better use of tactical intelligence would alleviate this
concern to some degree.
There are, as discussed, cultural and political
trends that could undermine improvements made
in this area. In addition to being predisposed to
restricting information flow, intelligence organizations
could slide back into their traditional role of acting
as a check on the other organizations, which would
only worsen trust issues and make information
sharing more difficult. A lot will depend on how the
new government decides to manage and control the
military. If it creates and relies on informal, alternate
networks, then, very likely, intelligence sharing and
capability development will stagnate and eventually
degrade.
If this happens, then Iraqi Army operations will
begin to look more like they did in the past when the
army targeted based solely on human intelligence,
some of which is uncorroborated and has been used
to settle personal scores rather than larger military
objectives. Though doing so was sometimes effective,
the ability of Da’esh to escape before Iraqi troops
reached their targets often enabled them to determine
who the source was. As a result of these operations,
the Iraqi Army often lost sources. This vicious cycle
will likely again lead to a significant degradation
of the army’s ability to target terrorists and their
facilities. Furthermore, the resulting imprecision
would further encourage mass arrests and detentions,
which may have the effect of temporarily disrupting
some terrorist operations, but may also anger the
population, driving them into the opposition’s camp.
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ABSENTEEISM, ADMINISTRATION, AND RISK
AVERSION
Absenteeism has long been documented as
endemic in the Iraqi Army. Despite the fact that the
Jones Report observed the Iraqi Army possessed “an
adequate supply of willing and able manpower,” it
also noted that all of the services and ministries had
difficulty with the administrative tasks associated
with accountability for personnel.199 Underscoring that
last point, the 2007 Government Accountability Office
report cited high absenteeism as well as near-complete
administrative inability to account for personnel as
significant impediments to ISF development and
operations.200 The problem, of course, runs deeper than
simple absenteeism or poor administrative capacities,
and there is little reason to think it has changed
significantly, even after the success against Da’esh.
The first of these practices is using “ghost
soldiers,” where commanders place additional
soldiers on the rolls in order to collect the pay those
soldiers are owed. In some cases, these soldiers exist;
however, commanders permit them to remain home
for extended periods, returning once a month to
collect part of their salaries, while the commander
keeps the rest. In other cases, these soldiers do not
exist, as commanders simply add names to their rolls
(or do not report desertions) to increase the amount
of money the unit receives to pay its soldiers.201 This
199. Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 9.
200. Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq, 11.
201. Morris, “Iraqi Army Faces Death.” See also Michael
Knights, “Bringing Iraq’s Ghost Soldiers Back to Life,”
The Washington Institute, December 10, 2014, https://www
.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/bringing-iraqs-ghost
-forces-back-to-life. See also Gray, Embedded, 95.
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creates a perception of favoritism and increases the
workload of the soldiers who remain.
Anecdotal evidence suggests the practice is wide
enough to have a significant impact. Prime Minister
Abadi publicly announced in December 2014 that
there were 50,000 ghost soldiers in the military.202
Other estimates suggest 30–40 percent of any given
unit may be ghosts.203 This practice, combined with
poor living and working conditions, creates soldiers
who are mistrustful of their leadership and who take
their frustrations out on a population they perceive as
hostile. For example, when the Iraqi Army responded
to Da’esh forces in Qere Tepe, they also turned on
the Sunni population. As one account noted, “[i]
nstead of chasing the gunmen, the soldiers turned on
the residents of the Sunni-majority village . . . troops
raided the homes the militants had used for cover and
arrested a dozen people, including two elderly men.”204
More to the point, where these conditions are
present, trust is absent. In addition to there being very
little reason for Iraqi soldiers to trust their leadership,
when soldiers take their frustration out on the local
citizenry, there is little reason for that citizenry to trust
them. When fighting renewed in late 2012, there were
mass desertions. Though it is difficult to get accurate
numbers, frequent references in the Iraqi press suggest
that the problem is significant.205 In fact, in August
2013, Maliki issued an amnesty for deserters in hopes
of getting the soldiers to return.206 Given that this
202. Knights, “Bringing Iraq’s Ghost Soldiers.”
203. Rayburn and Sobchak, The US Army, 589–590.
204. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.”
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amnesty was offered prior to Da’esh seizure of Mosul
and Anbar and the subsequent increase in fighting, it
suggests that the desertions were motivated, in part
at least, by the conditions under which the soldiers
served more so than the threats they faced.
All of these conditions, of course, have a profound
impact on discipline—or the lack thereof. One adviser
reported in 2007 that discipline in the new Iraqi Army
was characterized by a lack of respect for officers not
seen in the old army. Moreover, there is evidence that
the officers, at least at the time, did not care. The Jones
Report also cited ineffective implementation of the
Iraqi Code of Military Discipline as a significant point
of concern.207 As the advisor described it:
Sadly, the Iraqi Army is set up so that soldiers have no
service obligation and face no legal punishments. If a
jundi [soldier] decides the Iraqi army sucks and wants
to quit, he can. Likewise, if he wants to tell a superior
officer to rot in hell, he can. In the Iraqi army it is nearly
impossible for officers to maintain military rule that is
necessary to execute combat operations. A formal legal
system simply does not exist. The only way for officers to
punish the jundi is to take away pay or leave, but when
they implement this punishment, the jundi just quit.208

To the extent that the Iraqi Army has not made
improvements in enforcing its disciplinary code, it
will very likely backslide into the ineffective force of
2014.

troops deployed in Anbar and other areas in the north where ISIS
is active.”
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SECTARIANISM AND MILITIA INFLUENCE
As suggested above, sectarian and militia
influences will continue to plague the Iraqi Army,
much as they did prior to 2007 when Iraq nearly fell
into civil war, though the nature of that influence has
changed. At one level, sectarian influence in the Iraqi
Army is structural. As noted above, when the United
States reformed the Iraqi Army in 2004, it deliberately
set demographic quotas for the newly formed units.
Though there were some anecdotes of cross-sectarian
cooperation,209 for the most part, these demographic
divides undermined organizational trust and created
barriers to effective communication, coordination, and
cooperation within organizations.
For example, in May 2013, the Kurdish commander
of the 16th Brigade of the 4th Division refused orders to
rotate his unit out of the disputed internal boundaries
and defected with the rest of the Kurdish soldiers
and their equipment to the peshmerga, in a way
reminiscent of how Kurds in the Iraqi Army defected
in the sixties and seventies.210 Though this defection
did not significantly impact Baghdad’s fight against
the Islamists, it did illustrate the point that until Iraq
resolves its sectarian political issues, the sectarian

209. Brasier, But Ma’am, 24. Brasier relates that sectarian
boundaries seemed to drop when a Kurdish officer saved the life
of a Shia officer after a traffic accident.
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identities of its leaders and forces will continue to
negatively impact its operational capabilities.
Moreover, political parties, especially Shia ones,
took advantage of these quotas to ensure personnel,
especially those in leadership positions, were loyal to
their party. But rather than cooperatively pooling their
resources to develop effective forces, these parties—
even ones which shared a sectarian identity—
competed for positions within the new forces. Thus,
the struggle was better described in political, not
sectarian, terms. But since these parties aligned
with particular sects, this political struggle naturally
became sectarian in nature.211 As a result, it was
often the case that members of some sects, especially
Sunnis, were displaced both because they were not
trusted and to make room for personnel associated
with other competing parties. Whatever the source,
these sectarian influences “eroded the dependability
of many Iraqi units,”212 rendering them “incapable of
providing security to the Iraqi public.”213
Further, militia relationships with the ISF worked
both ways, as soldiers would often moonlight for
militia organizations when they were on leave. As
one Iraqi officer put it, “You are a young military
man, strong, trained, and so forth. How can you not
join a militia when you get home? Your family and
tribe would be ashamed if you did not help the local
militia.”214
Additionally, as The Military Balance 2014 observed,
Maliki installed dimaj [integration] officers in the ISF
to contain possible Baathist resurgence following the
211.
212.
213.
214.

Pfaff, Development and Reform, 9–16.
Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq, 11.
Jones, Report of the Independent Commission, 9.
Gray, Embedded, 189.

74

reintegration of officers who served under Saddam.215
For the most part, these integration officers had
no military experience and were simply a vector
for political influence, further contributing to the
politicization of the ISF. It is not clear to what extent,
if any, they play a role in the current security services.
Unlike in 2007, when parties and militias battled
over control of the ministries and their resources,
these same sectarian entities now often compete
and cooperate with these ministries to ensure their
prominent and public role in improving the security
situation. In some cases, they coopt ISF units,
including uniforms, vehicles, and identification,
to ensure freedom of movement as they ethnically
cleanse Sunni neighborhoods. For example, in the
town of Buhriz, near Baqubah, Shia militia members
associated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq reportedly entered
the town at the ISF’s request to assist in responding to
Da’esh’s killing of an ISF officer. While in the town,
they detained a number of Sunni males and otherwise
disrupted civil life. As a press report noted, “[b]y the
following day, 28 villagers had been killed and several
houses torched, local officials said.”216 In other cases,
they conduct their own, independent operations to
secure Shia populations in mixed areas.
Additionally, to support their operations, these
same militias are known to extort funds through
kidnapping and other forms of organized crime, in
addition to more conventional, and legal, forms of
fundraising.217 As a result, in their zeal to contribute
215. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 2014, 322. Dimaj is Arabic for “integration.”
216. Bradley and Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military.” See also
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75

to Iraq’s security, they undermine the government’s
monopoly on force, which is a cornerstone of national
stability.218 This problem is especially acute where
militias associated with the PMF have stepped in
to fill the security vacuum. In these areas, militias
often extort money from locals by charging them for
protection or for simply using the roads, on which
they have established numerous checkpoints.
So though it would be wrong to say the ISF has
overcome its sectarian past, how that sectarianism
manifests itself continues to evolve as each faction
attempts to both carve out its own space and respond
to others’ attempts to do so. As former Office of
Security Cooperation—Iraq Chief Lieutenant General
Robert Caslen stated in 2013, “the Iraqis preserved
ethnic and sectarian diversity in the military’s upper
ranks, as instructed by the Americans. But the nation’s
divisions permeated even that arrangement. Officers
routinely bypassed the chain of command to deal with
soldiers from similar backgrounds. . . . There is a lot of
distrust in the organization.”219
FUTURE ENGAGEMENT
The current moment affords the United
States and its partners a unique opportunity to
advance the capabilities—and, to some degree, the
professionalism—of the Iraqi Army. Taking advantage
of this opportunity, however, will come with
significant challenges. At the time of this writing, the
results of the May 2018 elections have placed a mix of
pro-Iran, pro-Muqtada al-Sadr, and pro-United States
55–71.
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(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1964), 156.
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politicians in positions of power.220 Moreover, the PMF
has established itself as a security force practically, if
not constitutionally, separate from the MOD and MOI.
This division will ensure competition for funds and
resources and complicate the provision of US support,
requiring additional oversight to ensure militia
organizations do not benefit. Further complicating
the picture is the ISF’s role in killing and injuring
protestors who have been demonstrating against
Iranian influence and poor governance.221 In doing
so, it threatens the popular legitimacy and support it
gained in the fight against Da’esh.
Still, the United States has a number of
comparative advantages over Iraq’s other security
partners, especially Iran, that, if used properly, can set
conditions for a more professional army, improve the
Iraqi Army’s ability to partner with coalition forces
in the continued fight against Da’esh, and enable the
army to conduct unilateral operations that serve the
mutual interests of Iraq and the United States. Those
comparative advantages do not just include superior
weapons, equipment, and maintenance support. They
also include superior intelligence and logistics support
as well as, when appropriate, access to coalition air and
indirect fire assets. Though the Iranians have made
much in Iraqi media regarding their contribution
in the fight against Da’esh, most senior Iraqi leaders
220. Jessa Rose Dury-Agri and Patrick Hamon, “Breaking
Down Iraq’s Election Results,” Institute for the Study of War,
May 24, 2018, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder
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would acknowledge the decisive contribution the
United States-led coalition made to the outcome.222
Additionally, partnership with the United States
can facilitate greater connectivity to the international
community, which will increase the resources available
for development and which can, over time, bolster the
country’s legitimacy as a responsible, international
actor. Though there is not necessarily a correlation
between positive international engagement and an
increasingly trusted and competent Iraqi Army,
the benefits of such status and scrutiny do serve as
incentives for the Iraqis to make at least some of the
necessary reforms.
Despite
the
current
Iraqi
government’s
inconsistently positive relations with Iran, it is still
very likely Iraq will still seek some level cooperation
with the United States and its partners. After the
experience of fighting Da’esh with US assistance,
it will be difficult for Iraqi leaders to turn down the
quality of equipment, support, and expertise the
United States-led coalition can offer. In fact, Iraqi
leaders closely associated with Iran, such as Hadi
al-Amiri and Interior Minister Qasim al-Araji, have
expressed interest in continued security cooperation
with the United States as well as the presence of some
US troops.223 Moreover, Prime Minister Adel Abdul
Mahdi is known as a relatively moderate member of
the pro-Iranian Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq who
222. Matt Bradley, “Victory over Islamic State in Iraqi Town
Has Some Cheering Iran,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2015,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/victory-over-islamic-state-in-iraqi-town
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lived in exile in France until the fall of Saddam. Thus,
future cooperation seems likely.224
Good relationships with a variety of Iraqi actors
will be critical to the success of US security cooperation
efforts. Mara E. Karlin, in Building Militaries in Fragile
States, argues that deep US involvement in a partner’s
“sensitive military affairs” and a diminishing role
of actors antagonistic to US involvement are critical
elements to successful security cooperation aimed
at assisting the ability of partners to provide for
internal defense.225 This point suggests US security
cooperators, advisors, and senior leaders should
work to develop sufficiently close relationships that
Iraqi military leaders accept advice and suggestions
regarding measures that will facilitate the Iraqi
Army’s development and reform. Failure to establish
such relationships should be considered a constraint
on the effectiveness of security cooperation efforts.
Unity of Command
Much of the Iraqi Army’s problems boil down
to one thing: leadership. Michael Knights, who
authored The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces on behalf
of the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, an
Iraqi think tank, argues Iraq needs a “powerful Chief
of Defense (CHOD)” who would serve as the “one
paramount military deputy to the prime minister.”
This CHOD should be nonsectarian; militarily
competent; and willing to improve discipline, punish
incompetence and corruption, and stand-up to the
224. “Iraq: Adel Abdul Mahdi named prime minister,”
Al Jazeera, October 3, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com
/news/middleeast/2018/10/iraq-adel-abdul-mahdi-named-prime
-minister-181003053509104.html.
225. Karlin, Building Militaries, 19.
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militias. Additionally, he argues for a “broadening
of capable junior leaders” who respond through
the chain of command to the “clearly recognized
leadership” of the CHOD.226 Knights is right about
the ISF needing such leadership; however, Iraq’s past
suggests obtaining it is unlikely, at least in the short
term, until the political and social dynamics that
divide Iraq’s loyalties are resolved and the army is
trusted by the government to work for it rather than
serve as a potential check against it. Thus, in the short
term at least, divided leadership will be a constraint
on the kind of capability development the Iraqi Army
can accomplish, even with US help.
• Having said that, the Iraqi Army could make
a great deal of progress with a leader who is
broadly trusted and able to reach across sectarian lines. US leadership can quietly identify
such leaders and encourage the Iraqi government to appoint them.
• At the same time, US security advisors should
identify alternative chains of command and
continue to discourage their use by reinforcing the formal chain. To facilitate this effort,
US advisors should reinforce ties between the
MOD, the National Operations Center, and the
chief of the army.
US security cooperators should also identify
overlapping areas of responsibility within the army
and within the other services and PMF and seek
ways to make competing roles and responsibilities
more complementary. For example, Knights
observes the PMF was good at defensive operations
in Shia-dominated areas; however, it was largely
incompetent at offensive operations in Da’esh-held
226. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 40–43.
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areas.227 It is worth pointing out that complementary
roles do not have to be entirely exclusive. There will
always be the potential for some overlap, especially
as counterterrorism and counterinsurgence efforts
involve the full range of security services. As noted
earlier, some jurisdictional competition is healthy, so
to the extent any overlap does exist, it can promote the
effectiveness of the profession.
Corruption
As noted above, corruption is endemic and
entrenched in the Iraqi government, not just the
security services. Though it is unlikely it will be
eliminated, units like the CTS have demonstrated it
can be reduced to a level such that it is not a barrier
to effective and professional leadership. But, as with
unity of command, any meaningful solution will
require strong and determined Iraqi leadership. The
United States should continue to encourage senior
Iraqi leadership to remove corrupt and incompetent
leaders at every level.
• To encourage that leadership, US security cooperators should make US support, including
training and equipment, contingent on units
adopting accountability practices, in the same
way the United States does end-service monitoring. The idea is to set up a dynamic where
a relationship with the US Army brings sufficient benefit—tangible and intangible—such
that abandoning corrupt practices will be
worthwhile.
• To support anti-corruption efforts, US security
cooperators should leverage support to get the
227. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 31.
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Iraqis to adopt procedures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. For example, rather than
providing funds directly to units to pay soldiers, the Iraqi Army should establish individual accounts at local banks. Soldiers would have
to physically go to the bank and provide adequate identification to receive their pay. While
not a foolproof system, it would make it more
difficult to employ ghost soldiers.
• To the extent technology can reinforce corruption-resistant procedures, US security cooperators should leverage support to get the Iraqis
to adopt it, consistent with their ability to use it
effectively.
• Conditioning US support on meaningful corruption reduction measures will likely limit the
units, organizations, and leaders with which
the United States can effectively cooperate, at
least in the short term. This point suggests the
United States should be prepared to provide
more direct support, including direct action,
to prevent a Da’esh resurgence. Thus, security
cooperation efforts should emphasize interoperability, including joint training, to exercise
the US ability to effectively support Iraqi Army
operations.
• Encourage senior Iraqi leadership to develop
and promulgate a professional ethic compatible with Iraqi culture which establishes an Iraqi
Army identity, encouraging commitment to
humanitarian ideals, competence, and effective
stewardship of the profession.
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Poor Combat Support: Communications,
Intelligence, and Logistics
Improving unity of command and reducing
corruption, will, of course, go a long way in improving
Iraq’s combat support capabilities. But divided and
corrupt leadership is not the only barrier the current
Iraqi Army has to developing these capabilities. There
are a number of technological and procedural hurdles
the Iraqis will have to overcome as well.
• Currently, a great deal of communication
among Iraqi Army units occurs over civilian
infrastructure that is extremely unreliable and
unsecure. Moreover, Iraqis tend to prefer to
use their personal cell phones to communicate,
even when military means of communication
are available. This point suggests that advisory engagement, as well as Title X exchanges,
aimed at encouraging the use and maintenance
of military communications should be a part of
any comprehensive security cooperation plan.
• In the years after the withdrawal of US forces
and before the fall of Mosul to Da’esh, US military intelligence cooperation was extremely
limited, despite numerous Iraqi requests for
assistance. Since poor intelligence has been a
frequent contributor to Iraq’s military disasters, US security cooperators should emphasize
intelligence cooperation and interoperability as
key elements of the security cooperation plan.
While Iraq’s relationship to Iran will likely limit
what intelligence the United States can share,
US advisors need to ensure authorities, permissions, and procedures are in place to share
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intelligence regarding Da’esh resurgence before
it metastasizes.
• US advisors should strongly discourage the
use of military intelligence units to secure the
Iraqi government against other security services. Though it makes sense for each service to
have effective counterintelligence and criminal
investigation units, the services need to be independent of the chain of command and strictly
focused on threats internal to the respective
organizations. US advisors are likely going to be
limited in their ability to monitor such relationships, so where they are present, they should be
seen as a constraint on cooperation.
• Regarding logistics and maintenance, Knights
reports Iraqis “remain fearful of trusting electronic systems, feeling they can minimize theft
and loss if they stick to paper and sign-offs they
are more familiar with.”228 Unfortunately, the
reality has been the opposite. Much of these
difficulties have been the result of degradation
of the Iraqi military following the 1991 Gulf
War, the subsequent sanctions that reduced
Iraq to a survival economy that relied on corrupt practices, and the disbanding of the army
in 2003 and the unfamiliar systems US advisors
imposed when trying to rebuild it. These points
suggest the following three measures for stimulating reform and building resiliency.
◦◦ Encourage the Iraqis to develop technical solutions that are compatible with their
capabilities and comfort level but that
can provide independent accounting for
supplies, spare parts, and maintenance
228. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 50.
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activities. Fixing Iraq’s combat support systems requires—to the extent possible—an
independent source of relevant information that illuminates corrupt and inefficient
practices in a way all parties, regardless of
sectarian affiliation, can trust. Technology is
one way to provide that.
◦◦ Decentralize logistics and maintenance operations to make the system more responsive.
◦◦ As with intelligence, Iraqi capabilities will
take a long time to develop and may not be
adequately capable by the time Da’esh has
been revived. This point suggests US security cooperators should emphasize logistic
interoperability so US logistics capabilities
can assist the Iraqis quickly in times of crisis.
Absenteeism, Administration, and Risk Aversion
As suggested above, all of these critical
vulnerabilities of the Iraqi Army are closely linked
to each other. Improving unity, reducing corruption,
and improving accountability will go a long way
toward reducing absenteeism and risk aversion, and
improving administrative capabilities will be critical
to all of these efforts. The goal here is to establish a
“virtuous cycle” where improving administrative
capabilities reduces corruption, leads to better quality
of life for soldiers, and thus increases trust in their
leadership. Such trust should reduce risk aversion
as well as incentivize improvements in combat and
combat support capabilities.
• Creating such a virtuous cycle requires improving the quality of Iraqi soldiers. As noted above,
in 2007 most Iraqi soldiers saw the military as

85

a job—and a miserable one at that. By 2018,
the Iraqi Army had partially restored the pride
Iraqis once took in the military; however, to
sustain that, the Iraqi Army must draw on more
educated and capable elements of its society.
Doing so suggests the following measures.
◦◦ Just as it did at its founding—and again
during the Iran-Iraq War—the Iraqi Army
needs to recruit capable individuals, particularly those in technical fields, to assume
roles as junior officers.229 Given the current
divisiveness of Iraqi politics, the government should not resort to conscription, as
this would likely be viewed as a means to
marginalizing certain populations, just as it
was in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, the government should capitalize on the current
public trust and provide strong incentives
for college students and graduates to join.
◦◦ As the Iraqi Army’s historic ideal suggests,
it can be very proficient at heavily scripted,
short-duration operations with very specific
objectives. But it will be some time before it
is capable of more complex operations without considerable external support. Thus,
US advisors should emphasize individual
and small-unit skills with the aim to build a
competent base of skilled soldiers and junior
leaders and to set the conditions for developing capabilities for larger unit operations.
◦◦ As noted earlier, the establishment of professional military educational institutions
was critical to establishing the army as a
profession. Thus, US security cooperators
229. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 44.
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should emphasize relationships with Iraq’s
professional military education schools.
These relationships should emphasize both
tactical and operational skills and the standards associated with establishing and
maintaining a profession. Additionally, the
United States should attempt to reinvigorate
Iraq’s Defense Language Institute English
language programs, as doing so would facilitate interoperability with US forces and the
larger coalition.230
Sectarianism
While it is worth noting that Iraq’s Shia population
are largely responsible for the protests directed at
Iran and the Shia-dominated Iraqi government,
it may be too soon to say that Iraq may finally be
getting past the sectarianism that has divided it since
the US invasion as the forces that tore it apart are
still, potentially at least, in play.231 Iranian influence,
especially when manifested by the brutal practices
of the PMF, continues to drive fear into the Sunni
population, which creates space for Da’esh or any
other group that claims to defend Sunnis’ interests.232
Any such resurgence would simply validate again a
willingness among the Shia majority to sanction harsh
measures against Sunni actors, resulting in the same
230. When the author toured the English language lab at the
Iraq Military Academy Rustamiyah in 2013, it appeared to be
largely unused.
231. “Fifteen Years after America’s Invasion, Iraq
is Getting back on its Feet,” Economist, March 31, 2018,
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/31
/fifteen-years-after-americas-invasion-iraq-is-getting-back-on-its-feet.
232. See Amnesty International, Iraq, for a fuller account.
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dynamics seen in 2014. The aftermath of the Kurdish
independence referendum in 2017 has both made
independence more remote and exacerbated divisions
among Iraq’s parties. So, in many ways, Iraq’s sects
are even more divided now than they have been in
the past. How those divisions manifest themselves
depends to a large extent on the actions of the new
government, the formation of which at the time of this
writing is incomplete. Playing a role in resolving these
tensions suggests the following measures.
• Do not let the presence of Iranian influence prevent relationship development with Iraqi units,
including the PMF. Given Iran’s location and
history with Iraq, it naturally has a strong security interest in how the ISF develops. Thus, it
would be naïve to expect it not to try to influence the ISF’s evolution and futile to try to stop it
from doing so completely. Zero tolerance of Iranian influence, a past US policy, simply will not
serve any purpose in post-Da’esh Iraq. Though
certain kinds of Iranian influence should limit
cooperation, not having any relations simply
cedes that space to them. Moreover, it reinforces the perception that Iran is dominant in
Iraq, which both stokes fear among Sunnis and
divides the various Shia groups, not all of whom
want to have such close ties to Iran. The key to
such relationships is to rely on US advantages
the Iranians cannot replicate and to make any
support contingent on taking the steps required
to build an Iraqi Army which is, among other
things, nonsectarian.
• Discourage the Iraqi government from indulging in the urge to create new security institutions and encourage it to place all security
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organizations under the direct operational control of either the MOD or MOI, as appropriate.
As the recent establishment of the PMF as yet
another force that directly reports to the prime
minister has shown, new organizations are often
just another means for some actor to engage in
malign influence.233
• Maintain a relationship with and support for
Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades, which are
peshmerga units that have agreed to respond
to Iraqi government control. After the events
in Kirkuk in 2017, when Iraqi Army units occupied territory in the disputed areas, the relationship between peshmerga and the Iraqi military
is tenuous at best, with the likelihood they
will be adversaries or allies an even split. The
United States should play a role in building up
the Regional Guard Brigades, but in a way that
builds, or at least does not undermine, ties with
Baghdad. In the zero-sum game of Iraqi politics,
supporting the Kurds could be seen by Baghdad as a threat and result in restrictions on its
cooperation with the United States. Alienating
Baghdad risks ceding more space to the Iranians, as good relations with Baghdad are necessary for contesting malign Iranian influence.
• When engaging a wide variety of potential Iraqi
partners, it is important to remember the United
States represents to some factions the same
kind of sectarian concerns Iran does.234 For that
233. Knights, The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, 37.
234. Gray, Embedded, 65. Gray reports multiple interactions
where Iraqis compared US forces to the British mandate. The
author had similar experiences in 2012–2013 and 2005–2006 when
serving in the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team.
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reason, the United States should continue to
encourage a wide variety of like-minded partners to develop security cooperation activities
with the Iraqis, much like the Italian Carabinieri’s
cooperation with the Iraqi Federal Police. More
international cooperation will both increase the
resources available to the Iraqi Army and legitimate the US presence in ways the Iranians will
not be able to replicate.
• To contain the growing influence of the PMF
as well as avoid the mistakes regarding ISF
integration made in the past, the United States
could encourage a local role for the various militias similar to the model the British employed
during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman. In that
country, the British convinced the Omani sultan
to establish Firqat, which were platoon-tocompany-sized organizations of tribal fighters
who came from the same tribes that were rebelling. They were employed locally, had a few
British Special Air Service advisors, and served
as scouts, guides, and home guards that were
able to consolidate regular Omani force gains.235
• The US should also actively release information
regarding PMF and Iranian malign activities,
especially violence conducted against Iraqis,
in order to undermine support for Iran and its
proxies both with the Iraqi public as well as the
international community.

235. Walter C. Ludwig III, “Supporting Allies in
Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,” Small
Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 1 (March 2008), 73.
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Table 2. Focus Areas for Iraqi and US Engagement
FOCUS AREA

IRAQI ACTION

US ACTION

OUTCOME

UNITY OF
COMMAND

Empowered CHOD,
ground force
commander; align
CTS, PMF under
MOD or MOI;
eliminate alternate/
overlapping chains
of command and
roles; improve
quality of junior
officers

Title X activities should emphasize communications,
use of issued
radios, communications
gear; actively
discourage alternate chains
of command

Empowered
CHOD and
subordinate
commanders
who effectively
address
corruption and
incompetence,
build trust;
adequate
communications
infrastructure
to securely
coordinate
operations
across multiple
operations
commands;
clear and
complementary
roles among
services

CORRUPTION

Eliminate
purchasing
commands, ghost
soldiers; fire corrupt,
ineffective officers;
pay soldiers through
individual bank
accounts; improve
professional
standards to create
extended trust

Identify and
advocate for
trusted leaders
in critical
positions;
leverage
support to
encourage
adoption of
anti-corruption
measures

Resource loss
due to corruption
does not affect
readiness;
widespread
perception
that corrupt
practices will be
punished and
good practices
rewarded;
improved trust

COMBAT SUPPORT (Communications, Logistics
and Maintenance,
Intelligence,)

Improve
communications
infrastructure;
automate
accountability to
extent possible;
decentralize
responsibility;
improve tactical
intelligence
collection/
dissemination

Title X activities should
emphasize
interoperability and exhibit
good practices;
encourage
like-minded
partners to
engage in
these areas;
decentralize
responsibility

The United States
and coalition
partners can
effectively
integrate their
communications,
logistics, and
intelligence
capabilities to
support Iraqi
operations; Iraqi
capabilities
gradually
improve
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Table 2 (continued)
FOCUS AREA

IRAQI ACTION

US ACTION

OUTCOME

PERSONNEL
(Absenteeism;
Administration;
Risk Aversion)

Adopt appropriate
technological
accounting and
management
solutions; better
enforce disciplinary
code; increase
recruitment of
college-educated
persons

Encourage
appropriate
technological
solutions to
accountability
and
management
issues; Title
X activities
should
emphasize
small-unit
tactics and
individual
soldier skills

Administrative
backbone capable
of accounting
for personnel
and equipment,
identifying
corrupt activities;
Iraqi soldiers and
units confident
in ability to
conduct limited,
short-duration
operations

SECTARIANISM

Align PMF under
MOD/MOI or establish complementary
roles; avoid creating
additional security
institutions; eliminate demographic
quotas; adopt Dhofar model for militia
integration—militias
integrated as groups
and which play local
security role under
control of the ISF

Consider
establishing
relations with
select PMF
units and
support those
willing to play
constructive,
nonsectarian
roles; support
the Regional
Guard Brigades, but
work toward
better integration with
MOD; encourage like-minded partner
engagement,
especially
with units
with which
the United
States may
not be able
to establish a
relationship

PMF plays complementary, defensive roles and
does not provoke
sectarian tensions; Iraqi-Kurd
cooperation/
interoperability
sufficient to avoid
misunderstanding; local militias
play constructive,
local security role
and are responsive to central
government
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CONCLUSION
With Da’esh no longer in control of Iraqi territory,
the rationale for US direct action, large numbers of
advisors, and robust intelligence and logistics support
will disappear. This point is true from the perspectives
of both Iraq and the United States. For the Iraqis’
part, they will likely accept—and the Iranians will
likely tolerate—only limited forms of US cooperation
against Da’esh and any other militant groups that
again threaten Iraqi sovereignty. For the United States’
part, limited resources and growing global security
challenges will likely divert its attention—and, with
it, security cooperation resources—elsewhere. These
points suggest whatever bilateral US cooperation
survives in post-Da’esh Iraq will be inadequate to the
task of wholly professionalizing the Iraqi Army, much
less the other defense and security institutions.
Despite this bleak assessment, all is not necessarily
lost. If, as de Toqueville observed, unwarranted
optimism is a condition of the American culture,236 it
is inevitable that the United States will try yet again.
The good news this time is the US military has a lot
more experience with what works and what does not,
as well as what is achievable.
It should be clear from this analysis that no
external party, neither the United States nor Iran, will
ever be in a position to entirely address the political,
social, cultural, and economic factors that impede
the Iraqi Army’s ability to professionalize. But by
directing attention to the conditions that facilitate the
236.
Jared Keller, “What Makes Americans So
Optimistic,”
Atlantic,
March
25,
2015,
https://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-american
-ethic-and-the-spirit-of-optimism/388538/.
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growth of a professional officer and noncommissioned
officer corps, one can help develop institutions that
communicate and expand expert knowledge as
well as the factors that undermine trust. In this way,
external actors can influence the Iraqi Army to make
the reforms necessary for it to become an effective
fighting force.
Moreover, the current moment in Iraq’s military
history gives it rare momentum to reform. The catalyst
for this reform is both the expected, long-term demand
to confront Da’esh and the benefits Iraq stands to gain
by playing a constructive security role as an accepted
member of the broader international community. Thus,
the long-term goal of US security cooperation with
Iraq should be to establish its military as a valuable
security partner capable of participating in regional
security arrangements, much in the same way Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and even Oman do. Of course, getting
to that point depends on political developments the
United States has limited ability to influence, much less
control. As such, failure to reconcile and accommodate
Iraq’s multiple competing factions would reinforce
alternate chains of command and undermine the
unity essential to reducing corruption and sectarian
influence. Unless these factors are addressed by a
forward-looking US military assistance program,
the Iraqi Army will remain one of the least effective
fighting forces in the Arab world, despite the courage
of its individual soldiers. The shortcomings of the
Iraqi Army and other security services identified in
this paper should both inform and constrain the kinds
and scope of security cooperation undertaken by the
United States.
Having said that, continued, steady engagement
emphasizing the critical areas discussed above should
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serve to set conditions for meaningful improvement
when political and social conditions permit. Of course,
no one measure is going to improve the Iraqi Army.
But, taken together, these recommendations represent
a good chance for US security cooperation efforts
to achieve a tipping point that enables the kind of
reform that can allow the Iraqi Army to move beyond
its historic limitations. As US security cooperators
attempt to set those conditions on what will likely be
a shoestring budget, getting to that tipping point will
require implementing measures aimed at building
trust within the Iraqi Army and with the other security
services and the civilian government. Building that
trust will allow the Iraqi Army to better harness the
resources it has, establish the kinds of institutions that
can sustain its current momentum toward meaningful
reform, and establish itself as a professional, effective
military force in a region in desperate need of stability.
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